\n π β π§ β β‘οΈ\n
\n\n[](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@davidwells/op-stash)\n[](./LICENSE)\n[](https://nodejs.org)\n\n**Stop re-authorizing 1Password for every fresh process.** `op-stash` is a per-user, in-memory cache daemon for 1Password `op://` secret reads β zero dependencies, nothing ever written to disk.\n\n```bash\nnpm install -g @davidwells/op-stash\nop-stash read op://Private/MyItem/password # prompts once, caches 5 minutes\n```\n\n## TL;DR\n\n**The problem.** 1Password CLI authorization is per-process. Agent workflows and scripts that repeatedly spawn fresh Node processes β `configx .env -- node script.js`, again and again β trigger a biometric prompt on every single run, because each process starts with no memory of the last one.\n\n**The solution.** A tiny daemon holds resolved secret values in memory, keyed by an opaque hash, behind a `0600` Unix socket only your user can touch. The first read runs `op` and prompts; every read within the TTL β from *any* process β returns instantly with no prompt. Values live for 5 minutes by default and never touch disk.\n\n| Why `op-stash` | |\n|---|---|\n| π **Cross-process** | Fresh processes share the cache β the exact thing plain `op read` can't do |\n| π§ **Memory only** | No cache file, no log file, no disk persistence, ever |\n| β±οΈ **Short-lived by default** | 5-minute TTL, daemon-enforced ceiling, background sweep, idle auto-exit |\n| π **Zero dependencies** | `node:crypto`, `node:net`, and nothing else in the tree |\n| π€ **Agent-friendly** | `--json` on every diagnostic command; secrets only ever on `read` stdout |\n| ποΈ **Scopeable** | Partition entries per agent thread, terminal, or CI job so nothing shares by accident |\n| πͺ **Escape hatch** | `OP_STASH_DISABLED=1` bypasses everything, instantly |\n\n## Quick Example\n\n```bash\nop-stash read op://Private/MyItem/password # 1Password prompts, value cached\nop-stash read op://Private/MyItem/password # instant, no prompt (cache hit)\nop-stash stats --json # {\"type\":\"stats\",\"entries\":1,\"hits\":1,\"misses\":1,...}\nop-stash read op://Private/MyItem/password --ttl 30m --scope session:my-agent\nop-stash clear # wipe all cached values now\nop-stash stop # kill the daemon (and everything in it)\n```\n\n## How It Works\n\n```text\nβββββββββββββββ 1. get(key) ββββββββββββββββββββ\nβ your process ββββββββββββββββΆβ op-stash daemon β in-memory TTL cache\nβ (op-stash / βββββββββββββββββ (per-user, 0600 β never runs op\nβ API caller) β hit: value β unix socket) β never touches disk\nββββββββ¬ββββββββ ββββββββββββββββββββ\n β miss\n βΌ 2. op read --no-newline βββ 1Password prompt happens HERE,\nβββββββββββββββ in YOUR process, so the app\nβ op CLI β attributes it to your terminal\nββββββββ¬ββββββββ\n β 3. set(key, value, ttl) βββΆ daemon stores it for the next process\n βΌ\n stdout\n```\n\nThe load-bearing design rule: **the daemon never executes `op`**. Cache misses are resolved by the client process, so 1Password's app integration, terminal attribution, and authorization prompts behave exactly as they do without op-stash. The daemon is only a short-term memory.\n\n## Design Principles\n\n1. **Memory is the only storage.** No value, ref, or log line ever reaches disk. Kill the daemon, the secrets are gone.\n2. **The client does the secret work.** `op` runs in your process; the daemon is a dumb store that can't reach 1Password at all.\n3. **Opt-in everywhere.** Nothing enables caching implicitly β not installation, not the Configorama plugin, nothing. You write `cache: { provider: 'op-stash' }` or it doesn't happen.\n4. **Fail loudly, degrade explicitly.** A configured-but-broken cache errors by default; `fallbackToOp: true` is the deliberate opt-in to silent degradation.\n5. **Bounded lifetime beats encryption.** Encrypting values inside the daemon would put the key in the same memory the attacker would read β theater. Short TTLs, sweeps, and idle exit actually shrink the exposure window. (See [Security Model](#security-model).)\n\n## vs Alternatives\n\n| | `op-stash` | Plain `op read` | `.env` file on disk | `OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN` |\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n| Prompts per fresh process | First one only (per TTL) | Every process | None | None |\n| Secrets on disk | Never | Never | **Plaintext, forever** | Token in env/shell rc |\n| Secret lifetime | Minutes (TTL) | Instantaneous | Unbounded | Token lifetime |\n| Works offline after first read | Within TTL | No | Yes | No |\n| Setup | `npm i -g`, nothing else | Nothing | Manual copying | Service account admin |\n| Best for | Interactive agent loops | One-off reads | Nothing, honestly | Headless CI |\n\n## Install\n\n```bash\n# global CLI\nnpm install -g @davidwells/op-stash\n\n# or as a project dependency (programmatic API + local bin)\nnpm install @davidwells/op-stash\npnpm add @davidwells/op-stash\n```\n\nRequires Node >= 22 and the [1Password CLI](https://developer.1password.com/docs/cli/get-started/) (`op`) on `PATH`. macOS and Linux; on Windows every command transparently falls through to direct `op` execution with no caching.\n\n## Quick Start\n\n1. Install: `npm install -g @davidwells/op-stash`\n2. Read a secret: `op-stash read op://