---
name: lisa-analyze-claude-remote
description: "Audit whether the current repository can run as a Claude Code remote routine (cloud session). Read-only analysis that inventories what Lisa AND the host project need to configure or build in the cloud environment — external CLIs/binaries to install, environment variables and secrets to set, startup hooks and their headless-safety, MCP server scope/transport/auth, user-scoped config and auto-memory gaps that don't replicate to the cloud, and platform constraints (bun proxy, IP allowlist, network tier, no interactivity). Reads `.lisa.config.json` `tracker`/`source` to determine which tracker/PRD-source integrations are active, resolves each to its headless-viable substrate (CLI/curl + token, never browser-OAuth MCP, never OS-keychain), and spells out the exact secret env vars, where to obtain each token, and the precise access scope required — without guessing. Emits grouped findings plus a machine-readable inventory that /lisa:generate-claude-remote-build-script consumes."
allowed-tools: ["Skill", "Bash", "Read", "Glob", "Grep"]
---

# Analyze Claude Remote: $ARGUMENTS

Run a read-only audit of whether **this repository can run as a Claude Code remote routine**
(a cloud session that runs on Anthropic-managed infrastructure, not the user's machine), and
inventory everything that would have to be **installed** or **configured** in the cloud
environment for both Lisa and the host project to function.

## Purpose

Claude Code routines run in a fresh cloud environment that clones the repo from its default
branch. Setup scripts (to install tools) and environment variables (to provide config/secrets)
are configurable per environment — but **only repo-committed Claude Code config reaches the
cloud**, user-scoped config and machine-local auto-memory do not, and some local affordances
(interactive auth, stdio MCP, desktop control, statusline) cannot work headless at all.

This skill produces the answer to: *"If I turn this repo into a routine, what do I need to put
in the environment's setup script and env vars, and what simply won't work?"* It is the
read-only analysis half; `/lisa:generate-claude-remote-build-script` turns its inventory into an
actual setup script.

This skill ships in the base Lisa plugin and is distributed to every host project, so it must
discover requirements **dynamically from the repo** rather than assuming Lisa-repo specifics. It
audits two layers together:

- **Lisa's needs** — startup hooks (`install-pkgs.sh`, `setup-jira-cli.sh` — tracker-gated, rule injection),
  the configured `tracker`/`source`, and the CLIs/MCP/env those imply.
- **The host project's needs** — its own package manager, build/test tooling, app runtime
  dependencies, CI-assumed binaries, and project-scoped MCP servers.

## Inputs

- Optional flags in `$ARGUMENTS` to narrow scope (e.g. `--section=tools`, `--json` to print only
  the machine-readable inventory).
- The current repository root: `.claude/settings.json`, enabled plugins' `hooks/hooks.json`,
  `.mcp.json`, `.lisa.config.json` / `.lisa.config.local.json`, `package.json` (or other
  manifest), lockfiles, `scripts/`, `.github/workflows/`, and committed skills/commands/hooks.

## Confirmation policy

Do **not** ask whether to proceed. Once invoked, run the read-only audit, print the grouped
findings and the inventory, and stop. Do not mutate any repository, environment, tracker, or
automation state. The only legitimate reason to stop early is that the working directory cannot
be resolved to an inspectable repository root.

## Audit contract

Report grouped sections, each check tagged with one status:

- `REQUIRED` — must be installed/set or a routine run cannot do core work.
- `OPTIONAL` — needed only for a specific integration/stack that is dormant in this repo's config.
- `GAP` — works locally but **cannot** work in a cloud routine regardless of configuration;
  the user must change approach (e.g. promote a fact to a repo rule, switch a substrate).
- `OK` — already cloud-safe; nothing to do.
- `RISK` — likely to work but with a known cloud caveat the user should verify (e.g. bun proxy).

Group the findings as:

1. **Runtime & package manager** — resolve the package manager from `packageManager`, `engines`,
   and the lockfile. Identify the install command a `SessionStart` hook or the project would run.
   Flag `bun` as `RISK` (known cloud-proxy package-fetch issues) and note whether `engines`
   forbids fallback package managers. Confirm node/runtime version expectations.

2. **Startup hooks** — enumerate `SessionStart` and `SubagentStart` hooks from
   `.claude/settings.json` and every enabled plugin's `hooks/hooks.json`. For each, state what it
   runs, whether it is headless-safe, whether it needs network or write access to system paths,
   and whether it fits the cloud setup-script time budget (~5 minutes for environment caching;
   `SessionStart` hooks re-run every session and must be fast). Lisa's `install-pkgs.sh` and
   `setup-jira-cli.sh` are the usual headline items. Note that `setup-jira-cli.sh` is gated on
   `tracker: "jira"` — on a project using another tracker it exits immediately and needs no
   environment at all, so do not report its JIRA env vars as required there.

3. **External CLIs / binaries** — scan hooks, `scripts/`, committed skills/commands, and
   `.github/workflows/` for invoked binaries that a base cloud image likely lacks. Assume node,
   git, and coreutils are present; `gh` is available but should be installed explicitly if scripts
   call it. Classify each `REQUIRED` (core path uses it) vs `OPTIONAL` (only a dormant stack/skill
   uses it). Typical finds: `gh`, `jq`, `docker` (ZAP), `aws`, `acli`, `ruby`/`rubocop`,
   `python3`, `playwright`/chromium, secret scanners. Treat AWS as more than a
   binary install: if the repo invokes `aws`, imports AWS SDK packages, uses CDK/Serverless/SST,
   references `AWS_*` env vars, or documents `aws sso login` / `sso_*` profile setup, add the AWS
   credential findings in group 4b as well as the `aws` CLI tool finding.

4. **Environment variables & secrets** — scan for `process.env.*`, `${VAR}`/`$VAR` in shell,
   `secrets.*`/`env:` in CI, and config-referenced tokens. Group by integration (GitHub, AWS,
   Atlassian/JIRA/Confluence, Notion, Linear, Anthropic, notifications, feature flags, other).
   Cross-reference `.lisa.config.json` `tracker`/`source` to mark which credentials are **active**
   for this repo vs **dormant** (`OPTIONAL`). Separately classify host-project AWS usage in group 4b:
   AWS can be required even when it is not the tracker or PRD source. Distinguish *where* each var
   must be set, because the
   answer differs and getting it wrong sends the user to do redundant work:

   - **Committed `.claude/settings.json` `env` flags** (e.g. `CLAUDE_CODE_EXPERIMENTAL_AGENT_TEAMS`,
     `ENABLE_LSP_TOOL`, `BASH_*`) — this file is repo-committed, so it reaches the cloud and Claude
     Code applies its `env` block when it launches. These are **already provided — no action**.
     Surface them as `OK` (cite the file), not `REQUIRED`. Do **not** tell the user to re-enter them
     in the environment UI; a duplicate there only risks drifting from the committed value. The lone
     caveat: the setup script runs *before* Claude Code launches, so it cannot see these — flag any
     that the **setup script itself** would need (rare) as needing a UI value too.
   - **Secrets** (tokens/keys) — cannot be committed, so the committed `settings.json` can't carry
     them. These are the only vars that genuinely **must be set in the environment-variables UI**.
     Mark active-integration secrets `REQUIRED`; dormant ones `OPTIONAL`.

4a. **Tracker / PRD-source credentials** — this is the load-bearing part of the audit and must be
   driven by config, not by what the scan happens to find. Resolve the active integrations first:

   ```bash
   read_config() {
     local path="$1" local_v global_v
     local_v=$(jq -r "$path // empty" .lisa.config.local.json 2>/dev/null)
     global_v=$(jq -r "$path // empty" .lisa.config.json 2>/dev/null)
     printf '%s\n' "${local_v:-$global_v}"
   }
   TRACKER=$(read_config '.tracker')  # tickets: jira | github | linear
   SOURCE=$(read_config '.source')    # PRDs:   notion | confluence | github | linear
   ```
   (Apply `config-resolution`: `.lisa.config.local.json` overrides `.lisa.config.json`.) For the
   **active** `tracker` and the **active** `source` — and only those — emit a `REQUIRED` credential
   finding using the **Credential reference** table below. For every integration that is *not* the
   active tracker/source, its credentials are `OPTIONAL` (dormant) — never mark them `REQUIRED`.
   If `tracker` is missing, report a `GAP` for build-ticket flows with setup guidance instead of
   assuming JIRA.

   Two non-negotiable headless rules govern which substrate a routine can actually use:

   - **Browser-OAuth MCP is dead headless.** A routine cannot complete an interactive OAuth/SSO
     browser flow. So for any integration whose local substrate is an OAuth MCP (the committed
     `linear-server` MCP; the Notion MCP; the Atlassian MCP) or an interactively-authed CLI
     (`acli auth login --web`), the MCP/interactive tier is a `GAP` — the audit must route to that
     integration's **token substrate** (CLI/curl + API token) and report the token's env vars.
   - **OS keychain is absent headless.** Lisa's access skills read the token from the OS keychain
     first (`security` / `secret-tool` / `cmdkey`) and fall back to an **env var**. A cloud routine
     has no keyring daemon, so only the env-var fallback works. Always report the **env-var form**,
     including the per-account suffixed names (`ATLASSIAN_API_TOKEN_<slug>`, `NOTION_API_TOKEN_<slug>`,
     `LINEAR_API_KEY_<slug>`) when the integration keys tokens by email/workspace.

   For each active integration, the finding must carry: the env var name(s), where to get the token
   (`Acquire:` URL), and the **exact** access/scope required (`Access:`) — copied from the table, not
   guessed. If a value the table needs (server URL, project key, workspace id, email, team key) is
   missing from `.lisa.config.json`, flag it as a `GAP`/`Action:` to set it, rather than inventing one.

4b. **AWS operations credentials** — scan the host project for AWS usage independent of Lisa's
   tracker/source config:

   - `aws` CLI invocations in `scripts/`, package scripts, committed skills/agents, or
     `.github/workflows/`.
   - AWS SDK imports/packages (`@aws-sdk/*`, `aws-sdk`, `boto3`, CDK, Serverless, SST, Amplify,
     Terraform providers).
   - `aws sso login`, `aws:signin:*`, `sso_start_url`, `sso_account_id`, `sso_role_name`, or
     `sso_session` in docs or config.
   - `LISA_AWS_BOOTSTRAP_JSON`, legacy `AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID` /
     `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY`, `AWS_PROFILE`, role ARN, external ID, account, or
     CloudWatch/STS references.

   If AWS is present, emit an AWS credential finding and inventory entry. If the repo's current
   local path is `aws sso login` or an `aws:signin:*` script, classify that local path as a `GAP`
   for headless remote routines: it is an interactive browser/device-authorization flow and cannot
   complete in the cloud. Route to the AWS row in the Credential reference instead of suggesting
   SSO auth. The finding must name Lisa's headless substrate: one dedicated IAM
   user with only `sts:AssumeRole`; one complete Secrets Manager SecretString
   set as `LISA_AWS_BOOTSTRAP_JSON`; and `/lisa:setup-remote-aws`, which writes a
   named source profile plus automatically refreshed role profiles. Explicitly
   reject standard `AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID` variables because they can bypass the
   intended assume-role profile.

   When the repository contains concrete non-secret AWS metadata (role ARNs, account aliases,
   profile names, regions, or ExternalId values), include it in an `awsProfiles` inventory array so
   `/lisa:generate-claude-remote-build-script` can write matching `~/.aws/config` profiles. Never
   invent account IDs, ExternalIds, role names, or regions. If AWS is detected
   but profile metadata is absent, require a cdkstarter bootstrap bundle rather
   than asking the repository to reconstruct account metadata by hand.

5. **MCP servers** — read every committed `.mcp.json`. For each server report transport and auth.
   Project-scoped HTTP/SSE servers with no interactive auth are `OK`. Flag stdio servers as
   `RISK`/`GAP` (need a local process — only viable if the cloud session can spawn them from the
   repo). Flag interactively/OAuth-authed servers as `GAP` for headless auth — they cannot complete
   a browser flow headless **regardless of transport** (an HTTP MCP like `linear-server` is still a
   `GAP` because its *auth* is OAuth, not because of its transport). Before finalizing any
   OAuth/interactive/stdio MCP as a flat `GAP`, check for a documented headless substrate: a
   static-token MCP header, a vendor CLI that can login from an env token, or a token-authenticated
   REST API that the MCP wraps. If documented evidence exists, mark the MCP `headlessUsable: true`
   in the inventory, mark the supporting secret `required: false` / `secret: true` unless the
   integration is active, and set `replacedBy` to the concrete substrate rather than leaving it as
   an impossible capability. When an OAuth MCP backs an active tracker/source, do not stop at the
   `GAP` — cross-reference group 4a and point to the integration's token substrate as the headless
   replacement (e.g. `linear-server` MCP -> `LINEAR_API_KEY` + Linear GraphQL). Note any user-scoped
   MCP (`~/.claude.json`) as `GAP` — it never reaches the cloud; it must be moved into project
   `.mcp.json`.

   Use this data-driven hint table as seed evidence, and extend it only when you can cite a vendor
   doc or committed access-skill reference:

   | Match | Substrate | Env | Setup / wiring | Domains |
   |---|---|---|---|---|
   | `mcp.jam.dev`, `jam`, or Jam MCP entries | Jam CLI (`jam`) authenticated by PAT | `JAM_PAT` | install with `curl -fsSL https://native.jam.dev/install | bash`; export `~/.local/bin`; run `printf '%s' "$JAM_PAT" | jam auth login --token`; optionally `jam skills install` | `native.jam.dev`, `api.jam.dev` |
   | `mcp/sonarqube`, `sonarqube`, or SonarQube/SonarCloud MCP entries | Official SonarQube MCP (`sonar run mcp`), token-authed — runs headless as-is, no REST substitute | `SONARQUBE_CLI_TOKEN` (+ `SONARQUBE_CLI_ORG` for Cloud / `SONARQUBE_CLI_SERVER` for Server) | install the SonarQube CLI (`curl -o- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/SonarSource/sonarqube-cli/refs/heads/master/user-scripts/install.sh \| bash`) and `sonar integrate <agent>`; pre-pull the MCP container image in the setup script so it fits the cache budget; the MCP authenticates from the env token — never `sonar auth login` | `sonarcloud.io`, `sonarqube.us` (or the Server URL) |

   For PAT-bearer MCP substrates that really use the same MCP transport, include `mcpHeaders` in
   the inventory with a snippet such as `headers: { "Authorization": "Bearer ${VAR}" }` so the
   generator can print a commented `.mcp.json` example. Do **not** use that for Jam: Jam's preferred
   headless substrate is the `jam` CLI, so the generator should emit CLI setup lines instead of an
   `.mcp.json` header snippet.

   When no documented substrate is known, keep the MCP as `headlessUsable: false` / `GAP`, and add
   an action line like: `check the vendor for a documented PAT, API-key, CLI, or REST substrate`.
   Never assert that no substrate exists unless the vendor documentation explicitly says so.

6. **Config scope & memory gaps** — identify reliance on user-scoped config that will not load
   remotely: `~/.claude/CLAUDE.md`, user `enabledPlugins`, user skills/agents, user MCP. Most
   importantly, flag **auto-memory** as a `GAP`: the persistent file-based memory directory is
   machine-local and is not synced to cloud routines, so any learnings stored there are absent in
   a remote run. Recommend promoting load-bearing memories into committed `.claude/rules/`.

7. **Platform constraints** — surface the non-config constraints as `GAP`/`RISK` so the user is
   not surprised: routines run with no interactive permission prompts and cannot ask the user
   mid-run; interactive auth (SSO/OAuth browser, keychain) is unavailable; GitHub org IP
   allowlisting blocks cloud sessions; raw GitHub clone/fetch/push operations are handled by
   Claude's connected-GitHub proxy/identity and do not need a separate PAT; the `gh` CLI is not the
   same substrate and still needs `GH_TOKEN`; outbound traffic is controlled by the routine
   environment network tier, where the default Trusted tier includes common development domains and
   package registries but arbitrary integration hosts need Custom or Full access; environment
   variables and setup scripts are stored in the cloud environment configuration and are visible to
   anyone who can edit that environment; resource limits (~4 vCPU / 16 GB RAM / 30 GB disk); no
   desktop/computer-use; no statusline/theme rendering.

8. **Host-project app needs** — note any build/test/run command a routine would invoke and any
   runtime service it depends on (database, queue, external API) that will not exist in a fresh
   cloud environment, so the user can decide whether the routine's task is even feasible there.

## Credential reference (tracker / source → headless secret)

Authoritative mapping for group 4a, transcribed from Lisa's `setup-*` skills and access layers
(`setup-github`, `setup-atlassian`, `setup-jira`, `setup-notion`, `setup-linear`,
`atlassian-access`, `notion-access`). Use the row for the **active** `tracker`/`source` only. Report
the **env-var form** of each secret — keychain reads do not work in a cloud routine. Slugs:
`<email-slug>` = email via `tr '[:upper:]@.' '[:lower:]__'`; `<ws-slug>` = workspace via
`tr '[:upper:]-' '[:lower:]_'`. If a token has both an unsuffixed and a per-account form, the
unsuffixed `…_TOKEN`/`…_KEY` is the simplest to set in a single-account routine.

### GitHub — `tracker: github` and/or `source: github`
- Headless substrate: `gh` CLI authed by token (every Lisa GitHub script gates on `gh auth status`).
- Platform substrate: Claude's connected-GitHub proxy/identity authenticates raw git
  clone/fetch/push for repositories the routine can access. Do not ask for a PAT solely for raw git
  or sibling-repo clones.
- Env: `GH_TOKEN` for the `gh` CLI only; set it because Lisa's PR/issue lifecycle shells out to
  `gh`. Do not describe it as required for raw git clone/fetch/push.
- Acquire: fine-grained — `https://github.com/settings/personal-access-tokens`; classic — `https://github.com/settings/tokens`.
- Access: fine-grained → Repository access to the repo(s) where Lisa will run `gh` commands (the
  project repo, and the Lisa repo only if filing Lisa issues); Repository permissions: Contents R/W,
  Issues R/W, Pull requests R/W, Metadata R (mandatory); add Workflows R/W only if editing
  `.github/workflows`, and Organization → Projects R/W only if using ProjectV2. Do not include
  sibling repos that are only cloned/fetched with raw git. Classic equivalent: `repo` + `workflow`
  (+ `project`, `read:org` for boards). The identity must hold WRITE/MAINTAIN/ADMIN on the repo.

### JIRA — `tracker: jira`
- Headless substrate: `jira-cli` + curl (Basic auth). The acli and Atlassian-MCP tiers need prior interactive/OAuth auth → not viable headless.
- Env: `JIRA_API_TOKEN`, `JIRA_SERVER` (e.g. `https://acme.atlassian.net`), `JIRA_LOGIN` (account email), `JIRA_PROJECT` (default project key); optional `JIRA_INSTALLATION` (default `cloud`), `JIRA_BOARD`. (`setup-jira-cli.sh` writes the jira-cli config from these on SessionStart — but only when `.lisa.config*.json` sets `tracker: "jira"`; on any other tracker the hook is a no-op.)
- Acquire: `https://id.atlassian.com/manage-profile/security/api-tokens`.
- Access: the API token inherits the Atlassian user's permissions — the user must have Browse/Create/Edit/Transition on the target project. An unscoped token suffices for jira-cli; a scoped token must cover the JIRA project read/write operations.

### Confluence — `source: confluence`
- Headless substrate: curl + Basic auth + **scoped** API token.
- Env: `ATLASSIAN_API_TOKEN` (or per-account `ATLASSIAN_API_TOKEN_<email-slug>`). Config (`.lisa.config.json`): `atlassian.cloudId`, `atlassian.site`, `atlassian.email`.
- Acquire: `https://id.atlassian.com/manage-profile/security/api-tokens` → "Create API token **with scopes**" → App: **Confluence**.
- Access (select EXACTLY): `read:page:confluence`, `read:hierarchical-content:confluence`, `read:comment:confluence`, `read:space:confluence`, `write:page:confluence`, `write:comment:confluence`, `write:label:confluence`, `search:confluence`.

### Notion — `source: notion`
- Headless substrate: curl + Bearer + internal-integration token. The Notion MCP tier is OAuth → not viable headless.
- Env: `NOTION_API_TOKEN` (or per-account `NOTION_API_TOKEN_<ws-slug>`). Config: `notion.workspaceId`, `notion.prdDatabaseId`.
- Acquire: `https://www.notion.so/profile/integrations` → New integration → type **Internal** → copy the `ntn_*` Internal Integration Token.
- Access: internal-integration token. **Non-optional:** share the target PRD database with the integration (Notion's share-based model) or every call returns 404/`object_not_found`.

### Linear — `tracker: linear` and/or `source: linear`
- Headless substrate: curl GraphQL (`https://api.linear.app/graphql`) + personal API key. The committed `linear-server` MCP is OAuth/browser → cannot authenticate headless; the API key is the only headless path.
- Env: `LINEAR_API_KEY` (or per-account `LINEAR_API_KEY_<ws-slug>`). Config: `linear.workspace`; `linear.teamKey` required when Linear is the tracker.
- Acquire: `https://linear.app/<workspace>/settings/account/security` → Personal API keys → New API key.
- Access: the personal API key inherits the user's workspace permissions — the user must be able to read/create/update Issues in the destination team.

### AWS — host-project operations, logs, deploys, CDK/Serverless/SST, or AWS SDK usage
- Headless substrate: cdkstarter's vendor-neutral remote-agent kit. Its single
  Secrets Manager SecretString contains the assume-only access key, ExternalId,
  and per-account role metadata. `/lisa:setup-remote-aws` writes a private named
  source profile and renewable role profiles; agents use
  `aws --profile <profile> ...`.
- Env: `LISA_AWS_BOOTSTRAP_JSON` (secret, required) and
  `LISA_REMOTE_AGENT` (plain platform label). Do not set `AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID` or
  `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY` in the remote environment.
- Allowlist: `*.amazonaws.com`, or narrower service hosts such as `sts.amazonaws.com`,
  `logs.<region>.amazonaws.com`, `cloudwatch.<region>.amazonaws.com`,
  `xray.<region>.amazonaws.com`, `ssm.<region>.amazonaws.com`, and service-specific endpoints the
  repo uses.
- Access: the bootstrap principal should have only `sts:AssumeRole` on the scoped operational role
  ARNs, preferably guarded by an `ExternalId` condition. The assumed roles carry the real
  permissions needed by the repo (CloudWatch Logs, deploy, SSM, etc.) as short-lived STS
  credentials.
- IAM Identity Center caveat: an IAM Identity Center permission set provisions an `AWSReservedSSO_*`
  role whose trust allows the SSO service, not an arbitrary IAM principal. A headless IAM principal
  cannot directly assume that reserved role. Use a separate assumable role that attaches the same
  policy as the permission set, with the delegated Identity Center admin keeping that policy as the
  source of truth.
- Alternative: IAM Roles Anywhere (X.509 to STS) when long-lived bootstrap access keys are
  unacceptable.

## Output

Render the report grouped exactly as above. Start with one `Summary:` line, then a `Counts:` line
covering `REQUIRED`, `OPTIONAL`, `GAP`, `RISK`, `OK`. Print each group as `<n>. <title>` and one
line per check as `- <STATUS> <id>: <summary>`, with optional `Observed:` and `Action:` lines
beneath that separate fact from advice. Render an empty group as a single `OK`/`SKIP` line with the
reason rather than omitting it.

Immediately after the grouped findings, render a **`Credentials to provision`** subsection — a
checklist of the secrets the user must set in the routine's environment for the **active**
`tracker`/`source` (from group 4a). One block per active integration, each with its env-var name(s),
an `Acquire:` URL, and an `Access:` scope line, plus a one-line note that the environment UI is where
these are set (the generated build script only emits a names-only template, never values). If both
`tracker` and `source` resolve to the same vendor (e.g. both GitHub), render it once. List **only
secrets** here — do not include the committed `.claude/settings.json` `env` flags; close the
subsection with a one-line reminder that those flags are already provided by the committed file and
need no UI entry.

End with a fenced, machine-readable inventory block (also printed when `--json` is passed) so
`/lisa:generate-claude-remote-build-script` can consume it without re-deriving everything. Secret
`env` entries for active integrations MUST carry `acquireUrl`, `accessScope`, and `headlessSubstrate`
so the generator can render acquisition comments into its template:

```json
{
  "packageManager": { "name": "bun", "installCmd": "bun install", "risk": "cloud-proxy" },
  "tools": [
    { "name": "gh", "required": true, "reason": "github-* skills and scripts shell out to gh" },
    { "name": "jq", "required": true, "reason": "hooks and scripts parse JSON" }
  ],
  "tracker": "github",
  "source": "github",
  "env": [
    { "name": "CLAUDE_CODE_EXPERIMENTAL_AGENT_TEAMS", "required": false, "secret": false, "providedBy": "settings.json", "uiAction": "none", "reason": "committed in .claude/settings.json env — applied automatically; do not re-enter in the UI" },
    {
      "name": "GH_TOKEN", "required": true, "secret": true, "integration": "github",
      "reason": "active tracker+source; gh scripts gate on gh auth status",
      "headlessSubstrate": "gh CLI (token)",
      "acquireUrl": "https://github.com/settings/personal-access-tokens",
      "accessScope": "fine-grained PAT on target repo: Contents R/W, Issues R/W, Pull requests R/W, Metadata R; +Workflows R/W if editing .github/workflows; +Projects R/W if using ProjectV2"
    },
    {
      "name": "JAM_PAT", "required": false, "secret": true, "integration": "jam",
      "reason": "optional non-tracker MCP recovery; Jam CLI can authenticate headlessly from a PAT",
      "headlessSubstrate": "jam CLI (PAT)",
      "acquireUrl": "https://jam.dev/docs/debug-a-jam/mcp/personal-access-tokens",
      "accessScope": "Jam Personal Access Token for the workspace/team whose traces the routine needs to read",
      "setupSnippet": "curl -fsSL https://native.jam.dev/install | bash; export PATH=\"$HOME/.local/bin:$PATH\"; printf '%s' \"$JAM_PAT\" | jam auth login --token; jam skills install"
    },
    {
      "name": "SONARQUBE_CLI_TOKEN", "required": false, "secret": true, "integration": "sonarcloud",
      "reason": "authenticates the official SonarQube MCP headlessly; the MCP runs as-is in a cloud routine (Docker is preinstalled), so no REST substitute is needed",
      "headlessSubstrate": "Official SonarQube MCP (token-authed)",
      "acquireUrl": "https://docs.sonarsource.com/sonarqube-cloud/managing-your-account/managing-tokens",
      "accessScope": "token must be able to read the target Sonar organization/project quality gate, issues, hotspots, rules, coverage, duplications, and dependency risks; add SONARQUBE_CLI_ORG (Cloud) or SONARQUBE_CLI_SERVER (Server)"
    }
  ],
  "mcp": [
    { "name": "linear-server", "transport": "http", "auth": "oauth", "headlessUsable": false, "replacedBy": "LINEAR_API_KEY + Linear GraphQL", "dormant": true },
    { "name": "jam", "transport": "http", "auth": "oauth", "headlessUsable": true, "replacedBy": "jam CLI + JAM_PAT", "dormant": true },
    { "name": "sonarqube", "transport": "stdio", "auth": "env-token", "headlessUsable": true, "replacedBy": null, "dormant": true }
  ],
  "awsProfiles": [
    {
      "name": "<project>-agent-dev",
      "roleArn": "arn:aws:iam::<account-id>:role/<role-name>",
      "credentialSource": "<project>-agent-bootstrap",
      "externalId": "<project-external-id>",
      "region": "us-east-1"
    }
  ],
  "gaps": [ "auto-memory not synced to cloud", "bun package fetch behind proxy", "OS keychain absent — env-var token form only" ],
  "platform": {
    "githubProxy": {
      "rawGitAuthenticated": true,
      "crossRepoAccess": "repositories reachable by the connected GitHub identity/routine access do not need a PAT for raw git",
      "ghCliNeedsToken": true
    },
    "secretsVisibility": "environment variables and setup scripts are visible to environment editors"
  },
  "networkAccess": {
    "tier": "custom",
    "allowlistDomains": []
  },
  "allowlistDomains": []
}
```

## Delegation and reuse

- Reuse `config-resolution` semantics (local overrides global) when reading `.lisa.config.json` /
  `.lisa.config.local.json` to decide which integrations are active vs dormant.
- Complementary to `/lisa:doctor`: doctor answers "is this repo ready to use Lisa locally?";
  this skill answers "can this repo run as a remote routine, and what must the cloud env provide?"
  Do not duplicate doctor's local-readiness checks — focus on the local-vs-cloud delta.
- The companion generator `/lisa:generate-claude-remote-build-script` consumes this skill's
  inventory block; keep the block shape stable.

## Rules

- Never mutate repository, environment, tracker, or automation state. This skill is read-only.
- Classify by **evidence in the repo**, not assumption — cite the file that proves each finding.
- Distinguish active from dormant strictly by the resolved `.lisa.config.json` config; do not mark
  a dormant tracker's credentials `REQUIRED`.
- Never report a `GAP` as satisfiable by configuration — a gap is a constraint, and the action must
  be a change of approach, not "set an env var".
- Never invent tools or env vars that no committed file references.
- Credential scopes and acquisition URLs come from the **Credential reference** table (sourced from
  Lisa's `setup-*` skills) — transcribe them exactly; never guess at the access a token needs.
- For the active `tracker`/`source`, always report the **env-var** form of the secret, never the OS
  keychain form — keychain reads do not work in a cloud routine.
- For GitHub, keep the split explicit: raw git uses the platform GitHub proxy/identity, while
  `GH_TOKEN` is for `gh` CLI commands. Sibling repos that are only cloned or fetched with raw git do
  not belong in the token scope.
- Add GitHub/npm/PyPI/Docker Hub/common development domains to neither `allowlistDomains` nor
  `networkAccess.allowlistDomains`; those are covered by the routine environment's default Trusted
  list. Only non-default integration hosts require Custom-network allowlisting.
- Always include a `RISK`/`GAP` finding when environment secrets or setup scripts would be visible
  to environment editors; never imply the generated script can hide them.
- A browser-OAuth MCP (or interactively-authed CLI) backing an active integration is a `GAP`; the
  remediation is its token substrate from the table, not "authenticate the MCP".
- `aws sso login`, `sso_*` profile configuration, and project scripts that wrap AWS SSO are
  interactive-auth paths. In a headless routine they are a `GAP`, not a setup step. Route AWS access
  to env-var bootstrap credentials plus assume-role profiles.
- For non-tracker MCPs, a documented CLI, PAT/API-key, or REST substrate converts the finding from
  a flat `GAP` into an `OPTIONAL` headless recovery path; unknown vendors remain gaps with a
  vendor-substrate follow-up, not invented credentials.
