<!-- Copyright (c) 2026 defconxt. All rights reserved. -->
<!-- Licensed under AGPL-3.0 — see LICENSE file for details. -->
---
name: implementing-wireless-ids
description: >-
  Deploy and configure Wireless Intrusion Detection Systems (WIDS) using Kismet for rogue AP detection, deauth monitoring, and wireless threat alerting.
domain: cybersecurity
subdomain: wireless-security
tags:
  - wids
  - wips
  - kismet
  - wireless-monitoring
  - intrusion-detection
version: "1.0"
author: defconxt
license: AGPL-3.0
compatibility: Designed for Claude Code, GitHub Copilot, OpenAI Codex, Cursor, Gemini CLI, and any agentskills.io-compatible agent.
metadata:
  mitre-attack: ["T1200", "T1557.002", "T1584.007"]
  nist-csf: ["DE.CM-1", "DE.AE-2", "DE.AE-5", "RS.AN-1"]
  uuid: a063786c-971a-42e4-b3f8-ad7cb9bc798d
---

# Implementing Wireless IDS

## Overview

Wireless Intrusion Detection Systems (WIDS) provide continuous monitoring of the RF
environment for unauthorized devices and attack activity. This covers Kismet deployment
and configuration, alert rule creation, rogue AP detection, deauthentication attack
alerting, client tracking anomaly detection, and integration with SIEM platforms for
centralized wireless security monitoring.

Mode: `[MODE: BLUE]` for this technique.

## Prerequisites

| Requirement | Details |
|---|---|
| Kismet wireless IDS (latest release) | Required |
| One or more monitor-mode wireless adapters | Required |
| Sensor placement plan covering facility RF footprint | Required |
| SIEM platform for alert aggregation (optional) | Required |
| Authorized device inventory for baseline | Required |

## Key Concepts

### WIDS Architecture

```
Wireless IDS Deployment:
├── Sensor Layer
│   ├── Dedicated WIDS sensors (monitor mode adapters)
│   ├── Coverage: overlapping RF zones
│   ├── Frequency: 2.4 GHz + 5 GHz + 6 GHz
│   └── Channel hopping vs. fixed-channel monitoring
├── Analysis Engine
│   ├── Kismet server (centralized analysis)
│   ├── Rogue AP detection logic
│   ├── Deauth flood detection
│   └── Client anomaly detection
├── Alert Layer
│   ├── Kismet alerts (REST API)
│   ├── Syslog forwarding to SIEM
│   └── Webhook/email notifications
└── Response Layer
    ├── Manual investigation
    ├── Automated containment (WIPS — deauth rogue clients)
    └── Switch port shutdown for wired rogue APs
```

### Kismet Configuration

```bash
# /etc/kismet/kismet.conf — key settings
source=wlan0mon:name=sensor1,hop=true,hop_rate=5/sec

# Enable logging
log_types=kismet,pcapng,wiglecsv

# Alert configuration
# /etc/kismet/kismet_alerts.conf
alert=ADVCRYPTCHANGE,5/min,1/sec
alert=AIRJACKSSID,5/min,1/sec
alert=BSSTIMESTAMP,5/min,1/sec
alert=DEAUTHFLOOD,5/min,1/sec
alert=MSFBCOMSSID,5/min,1/sec
alert=NULLPROBERESP,5/min,1/sec
```

### Kismet REST API

```bash
# Get all alerts
curl -s http://localhost:2501/alerts/all_alerts.json \
  -u admin:changeme | python3 -m json.tool

# Get detected SSIDs
curl -s http://localhost:2501/devices/views/phydot11_accesspoints/devices.json \
  -u admin:changeme

# Get specific device details
curl -s http://localhost:2501/devices/by-key/$DEVICE_KEY/device.json \
  -u admin:changeme

# Subscribe to alert stream (WebSocket)
wscat -c ws://localhost:2501/eventbus/events.ws -H "Authorization: Basic $(echo -n admin:changeme | base64)"
```

### SIEM Integration

```bash
# Forward Kismet alerts to syslog
# kismet_site.conf:
log_syslog=true
log_syslog_facility=local5

# rsyslog forwarding to SIEM
# /etc/rsyslog.d/kismet.conf
local5.* @@siem.corp.local:514
```

## Workflow

### Step 1: Sensor Deployment

Install Kismet sensors with overlapping RF coverage across facility.

### Step 2: Baseline Configuration

```bash
kismet -c wlan0mon --override kismet_logging.log_types=kismet,pcapng
```

Build authorized device whitelist from initial scan.

### Step 3: Alert Tuning

Configure alert thresholds to minimize false positives while detecting real threats.

### Step 4: SIEM Integration

Forward alerts to centralized SIEM for correlation with other security events.

### Step 5: Response Procedures

Document response playbooks for each WIDS alert category.

### Step 6: Continuous Tuning

Review alerts weekly, update whitelist, adjust thresholds based on false positive rate.

## Detection

```yaml
title: Wireless Ids Detection
id: 4ce2ca31-68b1-4416-b383-1c7c35b13384
status: experimental
description: Detects suspicious activity related to implementing wireless ids techniques in wireless security context
logsource:
  category: network_connection
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    DestinationPort: 443
    Initiated: "true"
  condition: selection
level: medium
tags:
  - attack.t1200
  - attack.t1557.002
  - attack.t1584.007
  - attack.initial_access
falsepositives:
  - Wireless intrusion detection system performing routine monitoring
```


**Detection Opportunities**

| Indicator | Source | Detection Logic |
|---|---|---|
| Wireless Ids Detection | windows/network_connection | Sigma rule (medium) |
| ATT&CK Coverage | MITRE ATT&CK | T1200, T1557.002, T1584.007 |

## Verification

- [ ] WIDS sensors cover all facility RF zones
- [ ] All frequency bands monitored (2.4/5/6 GHz)
- [ ] Authorized device whitelist maintained
- [ ] Alert thresholds tuned (acceptable FP rate)
- [ ] SIEM integration active and tested
- [ ] Response procedures documented for each alert type
- [ ] Monthly WIDS effectiveness review scheduled

## References

- NIST SP 800-153: Guidelines for Securing WLANs
- NIST SP 800-94: Guide to Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems
- [Kismet documentation](https://www.kismetwireless.net/docs/)
- CIS Controls v8 Control 13: Network Monitoring and Defense
