/**
 * @license
 * Copyright 2025 Google LLC
 * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
 */
import * as fs from 'node:fs/promises';
import * as path from 'node:path';
import * as crypto from 'node:crypto';
import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
import { Storage } from '../config/storage.js';
import { PolicyDecision, } from './types.js';
import { loadPoliciesFromToml } from './toml-loader.js';
import { buildArgsPatterns, isSafeRegExp } from './utils.js';
import toml from '@iarna/toml';
import { MessageBusType, } from '../confirmation-bus/types.js';
import {} from '../confirmation-bus/message-bus.js';
import { coreEvents } from '../utils/events.js';
import { debugLogger } from '../utils/debugLogger.js';
import { SHELL_TOOL_NAMES } from '../utils/shell-utils.js';
import { SHELL_TOOL_NAME } from '../tools/tool-names.js';
import { isDirectorySecure } from '../utils/security.js';
const __filename = fileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
const __dirname = path.dirname(__filename);
export const DEFAULT_CORE_POLICIES_DIR = path.join(__dirname, 'policies');
// Policy tier constants for priority calculation
export const DEFAULT_POLICY_TIER = 1;
export const USER_POLICY_TIER = 2;
export const ADMIN_POLICY_TIER = 3;
/**
 * Gets the list of directories to search for policy files, in order of increasing priority
 * (Default -> User -> Admin).
 *
 * @param defaultPoliciesDir Optional path to a directory containing default policies.
 */
export function getPolicyDirectories(defaultPoliciesDir) {
    const dirs = [];
    if (defaultPoliciesDir) {
        dirs.push(defaultPoliciesDir);
    }
    else {
        dirs.push(DEFAULT_CORE_POLICIES_DIR);
    }
    dirs.push(Storage.getUserPoliciesDir());
    dirs.push(Storage.getSystemPoliciesDir());
    // Reverse so highest priority (Admin) is first for loading order if needed,
    // though loadPoliciesFromToml might want them in a specific order.
    // CLI implementation reversed them: [DEFAULT, USER, ADMIN].reverse() -> [ADMIN, USER, DEFAULT]
    return dirs.reverse();
}
/**
 * Determines the policy tier (1=default, 2=user, 3=admin) for a given directory.
 * This is used by the TOML loader to assign priority bands.
 */
export function getPolicyTier(dir, defaultPoliciesDir) {
    const USER_POLICIES_DIR = Storage.getUserPoliciesDir();
    const ADMIN_POLICIES_DIR = Storage.getSystemPoliciesDir();
    const normalizedDir = path.resolve(dir);
    const normalizedUser = path.resolve(USER_POLICIES_DIR);
    const normalizedAdmin = path.resolve(ADMIN_POLICIES_DIR);
    if (defaultPoliciesDir &&
        normalizedDir === path.resolve(defaultPoliciesDir)) {
        return DEFAULT_POLICY_TIER;
    }
    if (normalizedDir === path.resolve(DEFAULT_CORE_POLICIES_DIR)) {
        return DEFAULT_POLICY_TIER;
    }
    if (normalizedDir === normalizedUser) {
        return USER_POLICY_TIER;
    }
    if (normalizedDir === normalizedAdmin) {
        return ADMIN_POLICY_TIER;
    }
    return DEFAULT_POLICY_TIER;
}
/**
 * Formats a policy file error for console logging.
 */
export function formatPolicyError(error) {
    const tierLabel = error.tier.toUpperCase();
    let message = `[${tierLabel}] Policy file error in ${error.fileName}:\n`;
    message += `  ${error.message}`;
    if (error.details) {
        message += `\n${error.details}`;
    }
    if (error.suggestion) {
        message += `\n  Suggestion: ${error.suggestion}`;
    }
    return message;
}
/**
 * Filters out insecure policy directories (specifically the system policy directory).
 * Emits warnings if insecure directories are found.
 */
async function filterSecurePolicyDirectories(dirs) {
    const systemPoliciesDir = path.resolve(Storage.getSystemPoliciesDir());
    const results = await Promise.all(dirs.map(async (dir) => {
        // Only check security for system policies
        if (path.resolve(dir) === systemPoliciesDir) {
            const { secure, reason } = await isDirectorySecure(dir);
            if (!secure) {
                const msg = `Security Warning: Skipping system policies from ${dir}: ${reason}`;
                coreEvents.emitFeedback('warning', msg);
                return null;
            }
        }
        return dir;
    }));
    return results.filter((dir) => dir !== null);
}
export async function createPolicyEngineConfig(settings, approvalMode, defaultPoliciesDir) {
    const policyDirs = getPolicyDirectories(defaultPoliciesDir);
    const securePolicyDirs = await filterSecurePolicyDirectories(policyDirs);
    // Load policies from TOML files
    const { rules: tomlRules, checkers: tomlCheckers, errors, } = await loadPoliciesFromToml(securePolicyDirs, (dir) => getPolicyTier(dir, defaultPoliciesDir));
    // Emit any errors encountered during TOML loading to the UI
    // coreEvents has a buffer that will display these once the UI is ready
    if (errors.length > 0) {
        for (const error of errors) {
            coreEvents.emitFeedback('error', formatPolicyError(error));
        }
    }
    const rules = [...tomlRules];
    const checkers = [...tomlCheckers];
    // Priority system for policy rules:
    // - Higher priority numbers win over lower priority numbers
    // - When multiple rules match, the highest priority rule is applied
    // - Rules are evaluated in order of priority (highest first)
    //
    // Priority bands (tiers):
    // - Default policies (TOML): 1 + priority/1000 (e.g., priority 100 → 1.100)
    // - User policies (TOML): 2 + priority/1000 (e.g., priority 100 → 2.100)
    // - Admin policies (TOML): 3 + priority/1000 (e.g., priority 100 → 3.100)
    //
    // This ensures Admin > User > Default hierarchy is always preserved,
    // while allowing user-specified priorities to work within each tier.
    //
    // Settings-based and dynamic rules (all in user tier 2.x):
    //   2.95: Tools that the user has selected as "Always Allow" in the interactive UI
    //   2.9:  MCP servers excluded list (security: persistent server blocks)
    //   2.4:  Command line flag --exclude-tools (explicit temporary blocks)
    //   2.3:  Command line flag --allowed-tools (explicit temporary allows)
    //   2.2:  MCP servers with trust=true (persistent trusted servers)
    //   2.1:  MCP servers allowed list (persistent general server allows)
    //
    // TOML policy priorities (before transformation):
    //   10: Write tools default to ASK_USER (becomes 1.010 in default tier)
    //   15: Auto-edit tool override (becomes 1.015 in default tier)
    //   50: Read-only tools (becomes 1.050 in default tier)
    //   60: Plan mode catch-all DENY override (becomes 1.060 in default tier)
    //   70: Plan mode explicit ALLOW override (becomes 1.070 in default tier)
    //   999: YOLO mode allow-all (becomes 1.999 in default tier)
    // MCP servers that are explicitly excluded in settings.mcp.excluded
    // Priority: 2.9 (highest in user tier for security - persistent server blocks)
    if (settings.mcp?.excluded) {
        for (const serverName of settings.mcp.excluded) {
            rules.push({
                toolName: `${serverName}__*`,
                decision: PolicyDecision.DENY,
                priority: 2.9,
                source: 'Settings (MCP Excluded)',
            });
        }
    }
    // Tools that are explicitly excluded in the settings.
    // Priority: 2.4 (user tier - explicit temporary blocks)
    if (settings.tools?.exclude) {
        for (const tool of settings.tools.exclude) {
            rules.push({
                toolName: tool,
                decision: PolicyDecision.DENY,
                priority: 2.4,
                source: 'Settings (Tools Excluded)',
            });
        }
    }
    // Tools that are explicitly allowed in the settings.
    // Priority: 2.3 (user tier - explicit temporary allows)
    if (settings.tools?.allowed) {
        for (const tool of settings.tools.allowed) {
            // Check for legacy format: toolName(args)
            const match = tool.match(/^([a-zA-Z0-9_-]+)\((.*)\)$/);
            if (match) {
                const [, rawToolName, args] = match;
                // Normalize shell tool aliases
                const toolName = SHELL_TOOL_NAMES.includes(rawToolName)
                    ? SHELL_TOOL_NAME
                    : rawToolName;
                // Treat args as a command prefix for shell tool
                if (toolName === SHELL_TOOL_NAME) {
                    const patterns = buildArgsPatterns(undefined, args);
                    for (const pattern of patterns) {
                        if (pattern) {
                            rules.push({
                                toolName,
                                decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW,
                                priority: 2.3,
                                argsPattern: new RegExp(pattern),
                                source: 'Settings (Tools Allowed)',
                            });
                        }
                    }
                }
                else {
                    // For non-shell tools, we allow the tool itself but ignore args
                    // as args matching was only supported for shell tools historically.
                    rules.push({
                        toolName,
                        decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW,
                        priority: 2.3,
                        source: 'Settings (Tools Allowed)',
                    });
                }
            }
            else {
                // Standard tool name
                const toolName = SHELL_TOOL_NAMES.includes(tool)
                    ? SHELL_TOOL_NAME
                    : tool;
                rules.push({
                    toolName,
                    decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW,
                    priority: 2.3,
                    source: 'Settings (Tools Allowed)',
                });
            }
        }
    }
    // MCP servers that are trusted in the settings.
    // Priority: 2.2 (user tier - persistent trusted servers)
    if (settings.mcpServers) {
        for (const [serverName, serverConfig] of Object.entries(settings.mcpServers)) {
            if (serverConfig.trust) {
                // Trust all tools from this MCP server
                // Using pattern matching for MCP tool names which are formatted as "serverName__toolName"
                rules.push({
                    toolName: `${serverName}__*`,
                    decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW,
                    priority: 2.2,
                    source: 'Settings (MCP Trusted)',
                });
            }
        }
    }
    // MCP servers that are explicitly allowed in settings.mcp.allowed
    // Priority: 2.1 (user tier - persistent general server allows)
    if (settings.mcp?.allowed) {
        for (const serverName of settings.mcp.allowed) {
            rules.push({
                toolName: `${serverName}__*`,
                decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW,
                priority: 2.1,
                source: 'Settings (MCP Allowed)',
            });
        }
    }
    return {
        rules,
        checkers,
        defaultDecision: PolicyDecision.ASK_USER,
        approvalMode,
    };
}
export function createPolicyUpdater(policyEngine, messageBus) {
    // Use a sequential queue for persistence to avoid lost updates from concurrent events.
    let persistenceQueue = Promise.resolve();
    messageBus.subscribe(MessageBusType.UPDATE_POLICY, async (message) => {
        const toolName = message.toolName;
        if (message.commandPrefix) {
            // Convert commandPrefix(es) to argsPatterns for in-memory rules
            const patterns = buildArgsPatterns(undefined, message.commandPrefix);
            for (const pattern of patterns) {
                if (pattern) {
                    // Note: patterns from buildArgsPatterns are derived from escapeRegex,
                    // which is safe and won't contain ReDoS patterns.
                    policyEngine.addRule({
                        toolName,
                        decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW,
                        // User tier (2) + high priority (950/1000) = 2.95
                        // This ensures user "always allow" selections are high priority
                        // but still lose to admin policies (3.xxx) and settings excludes (200)
                        priority: 2.95,
                        argsPattern: new RegExp(pattern),
                        source: 'Dynamic (Confirmed)',
                    });
                }
            }
        }
        else {
            if (message.argsPattern && !isSafeRegExp(message.argsPattern)) {
                coreEvents.emitFeedback('error', `Invalid or unsafe regular expression for tool ${toolName}: ${message.argsPattern}`);
                return;
            }
            const argsPattern = message.argsPattern
                ? new RegExp(message.argsPattern)
                : undefined;
            policyEngine.addRule({
                toolName,
                decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW,
                // User tier (2) + high priority (950/1000) = 2.95
                // This ensures user "always allow" selections are high priority
                // but still lose to admin policies (3.xxx) and settings excludes (200)
                priority: 2.95,
                argsPattern,
                source: 'Dynamic (Confirmed)',
            });
        }
        if (message.persist) {
            persistenceQueue = persistenceQueue.then(async () => {
                try {
                    const userPoliciesDir = Storage.getUserPoliciesDir();
                    await fs.mkdir(userPoliciesDir, { recursive: true });
                    const policyFile = path.join(userPoliciesDir, 'auto-saved.toml');
                    // Read existing file
                    let existingData = {};
                    try {
                        const fileContent = await fs.readFile(policyFile, 'utf-8');
                        existingData = toml.parse(fileContent);
                    }
                    catch (error) {
                        // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-unsafe-type-assertion
                        if (error.code !== 'ENOENT') {
                            debugLogger.warn(`Failed to parse ${policyFile}, overwriting with new policy.`, error);
                        }
                    }
                    // Initialize rule array if needed
                    if (!existingData.rule) {
                        existingData.rule = [];
                    }
                    // Create new rule object
                    const newRule = {};
                    if (message.mcpName) {
                        newRule.mcpName = message.mcpName;
                        // Extract simple tool name
                        const simpleToolName = toolName.startsWith(`${message.mcpName}__`)
                            ? toolName.slice(message.mcpName.length + 2)
                            : toolName;
                        newRule.toolName = simpleToolName;
                        newRule.decision = 'allow';
                        newRule.priority = 200;
                    }
                    else {
                        newRule.toolName = toolName;
                        newRule.decision = 'allow';
                        newRule.priority = 100;
                    }
                    if (message.commandPrefix) {
                        newRule.commandPrefix = message.commandPrefix;
                    }
                    else if (message.argsPattern) {
                        // message.argsPattern was already validated above
                        newRule.argsPattern = message.argsPattern;
                    }
                    // Add to rules
                    existingData.rule.push(newRule);
                    // Serialize back to TOML
                    // @iarna/toml stringify might not produce beautiful output but it handles escaping correctly
                    // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-unsafe-type-assertion
                    const newContent = toml.stringify(existingData);
                    // Atomic write: write to a unique tmp file then rename to the target file.
                    // Using a unique suffix avoids race conditions where concurrent processes
                    // overwrite each other's temporary files, leading to ENOENT errors on rename.
                    const tmpSuffix = crypto.randomBytes(8).toString('hex');
                    const tmpFile = `${policyFile}.${tmpSuffix}.tmp`;
                    let handle;
                    try {
                        // Use 'wx' to create the file exclusively (fails if exists) for security.
                        handle = await fs.open(tmpFile, 'wx');
                        await handle.writeFile(newContent, 'utf-8');
                    }
                    finally {
                        await handle?.close();
                    }
                    await fs.rename(tmpFile, policyFile);
                }
                catch (error) {
                    coreEvents.emitFeedback('error', `Failed to persist policy for ${toolName}`, error);
                }
            });
        }
    });
}
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