/**
 * Dependency-light terminal-injection defense.
 *
 * Strips ANSI/control bytes from text that originated in untrusted sources
 * (GitHub review content, on-disk substrate files, etc.) before it lands
 * in a `log.*` call. Per CR mmnto-ai/totem#1734 R2 + mmnto-ai/totem#1739
 * R2: raw text printed without sanitization is a terminal-injection
 * vector — a hostile reviewer or a tampered substrate can plant CSI
 * sequences that spoof cursor moves or color resets.
 *
 * Removes:
 * - CSI sequences (ESC `[` … final byte): the standard ANSI escape form.
 * - C0 control bytes other than `\n` and `\t`. `\r` (CR, `\x0d`) is also
 *   stripped because a bare CR rewinds the cursor and overwrites the
 *   current terminal line — exactly the surface this defense exists to
 *   close. Per CR mmnto-ai/totem#1739 R3 (Critical).
 * - C1 control bytes `\x80-\x9f`: 8-bit control-sequence variants per
 *   ECMA-48; CR mmnto-ai/totem#1739 R2 caught the original regex
 *   stopped at `\x7f`.
 *
 * **No imports.** Pure synchronous string manipulation — adding deps
 * here would pull them transitively into every `@mmnto/totem` consumer.
 * Originally landed in `@mmnto/cli` per CR mmnto-ai/totem#1739 R2 to
 * keep the pattern-history overlay on `--estimate` off the orchestrator
 * graph; promoted to `@mmnto/totem` core in mmnto-ai/totem#1744 so MCP
 * and other downstream consumers can use it without taking a CLI dep.
 */
export declare function sanitizeForTerminal(value: string): string;
//# sourceMappingURL=terminal-sanitize.d.ts.map