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From: kragen@pobox.com (Kragen Sitaker)
To: fork@spamassassin.taint.org
Subject: the underground software vulnerability marketplace and its hazards
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Date: Thu, 22 Aug 2002 00:24:54 -0400 (EDT)

On August 7th, an entity known as "iDEFENSE" sent out an announcement,
which is appended to this email.  Briefly, "iDEFENSE", which bills
itself as "a global security intelligence company", is offering cash
for information about security vulnerabilities in computer software
that are not publicly known, especially if you promise not to tell
anyone else.

If this kind of secret traffic is allowed to continue, it will pose a
very serious threat to our computer communications infrastructure.

At the moment, the dominant paradigm for computer security research
known as "full disclosure"; people who discover security
vulnerabilities in software tell the vendor about them, and a short
while later --- after the vendor has had a chance to fix the problem
--- they publish the information, including code to exploit the
vulnerability, if possible.  

This method has proven far superior to the old paradigm established by
CERT in the late 1980s, which its proponents might call "responsible
disclosure" --- never release working exploit code, and never release
any information on the vulnerability before all vendors have released
a patch.  This procedure often left hundreds of thousands of computers
vulnerable to known bugs for months or years while the vendors worked
on features, and often, even after the patches were released, people
wouldn't apply them because they didn't know how serious the problem
was.

The underground computer criminal community would often discover and
exploit these same holes for months or years while the "responsible
disclosure" process kept their victims, who had no connections in the
underground, vulnerable.

The problem with this is that vulnerabilities that are widely known
are much less dangerous, because their victims can take steps to
reduce their potential impact --- including disabling software,
turning off vulnerable features, filtering traffic in transit, and
detecting and responding to intrusions.  They are therefore much less
useful to would-be intruders.  Also, software companies usually see
security vulnerabilities in their software as PR problems, and so
prefer to delay publication (and the expense of fixing the bugs) as
long as possible.

iDEFENSE is offering a new alternative that appears far more dangerous
than either of the two previous paradigms.  They want to be a buyer in
a marketplace for secret software vulnerability information, rewarding
discoverers of vulnerabilities with cash.  

Not long before, Snosoft, a group of security researchers evidently
including some criminal elements, apparently made an offer to sell the
secrecy of some software vulnerability information to the software
vendor; specifically, they apparently made a private offer to
Hewlett-Packard to keep a vulnerability in HP's Tru64 Unix secret if
HP retained Snosoft's "consulting services".  HP considered this
extortion and responded with legal threats, and Snosoft published the
information.

If this is allowed to happen, it will cause two problems which,
together, add up to a catastrophe.

First, secret software vulnerability information will be available to
the highest bidder, and to nobody else.  For reasons explained later,
I think the highest bidders will generally be organized crime
syndicates, although that will not be obvious to the sellers.

Second, finding software vulnerabilities and keeping them secret will
become lucrative for many more talented people.  The result will be
--- just as in the "responsible disclosure" days --- that the good
guys will remain vulnerable for months and years, while the majority
of current vulnerabilities are kept secret.

I've heard it argued that the highest bidders will generally be the
vendors of the vulnerable software, but I don't think that's
plausible.  If someone can steal $20 000 because a software bug lets
them, the software vendor is never held liable; often, in fact, the
people who administer the software aren't liable, either --- when
credit card data are stolen from an e-commerce site, for example.
Knowing about a vulnerability before anyone else might save a web-site
administrator some time, and it might save the software vendor some
negative PR, but it can net the thief thousands of dollars.

I think the highest bidders will be those for whom early vulnerability
information is most lucrative --- the thieves who can use it to
execute the largest heists without getting caught.  Inevitably, that
means organized crime syndicates, although the particular gangs who
are good at networked theft may not yet exist.

There might be the occasional case where a market leader, such as
Microsoft, could make more money by giving their competitors bad PR
than a gang could make by theft.  Think of a remote-root hole in
Samba, for example.

Right now, people who know how to find security exploits are either
motivated by personal interest in the subject, motivated by the public
interest, motivated by a desire for individual recognition, or
personally know criminals that benefit from their exploits.  Creating
a marketplace in secret vulnerability information would vastly
increase the availability of that information to the people who can
afford to pay the most for it: spies, terrorists, and organized crime.

Let's not let that happen.




This is the original iDEFENSE announcement:

From: Sunil James [mailto:SJames@iDefense.com]
Sent: Wednesday, August 07, 2002 12:32 PM
Subject: Introducing iDEFENSE's Vulnerability Contributor Program


Greetings,

iDEFENSE is pleased to announce the official launch of its Vulnerability
Contributor Program (VCP). The VCP pays contributors for the advance
notification of vulnerabilities, exploit code and malicious code.

iDEFENSE hopes you might consider contributing to the VCP. The following
provides answers to some basic questions about the program:

Q. How will it work?
A. iDEFENSE understands the majority of security researchers do not publish
security research for compensation; rather, it could be for any of a number
of motivations, including the following:

         * Pure love of security research
         * The desire to protect against harm to targeted networks
         * The desire to urge vendors to fix their products
         * The publicity that often accompanies disclosure

The VCP is for those who want to have their research made public to the
Internet community, but who would also like to be paid for doing the
work.The compensation will depend, among other things, on the following
items:

         * The kind of information being shared (i.e. vulnerability or exploit)
         * The amount of detail and analysis provided
         * The potential severity level for the information shared
         * The types of applications, operating systems, and other
           software and hardware potentially affected
         * Verification by iDEFENSE Labs
         * The level of exclusivity, if any, for data granted to iDEFENSE

Q. Who should contribute to the VCP?
A. The VCP is open to any individual, security research group or other
entity.

Q. Why are you launching this program?
A. Timeliness remains a key aspect in security intelligence. Contributions
to some lists take time before publication to the public at large. More
often, many of these services charge clients for access without paying the
original contributor. Under the iDEFENSE program, the contributor is
compensated, iDEFENSE Labs verifies the issue, and iDEFENSE clients and the
public at large are warned in a timely manner.

Q. Who gets the credit?
A. The contributor is always credited for discovering the vulnerability or
exploit information.

Q. When can I contribute?
The VCP is active. You are welcome to begin contributing today.

To learn more, go to http://www.idefense.com/contributor.html. If you have
questions or would like to sign up as a contributor to the VCP, please
contact us at contributor@idefense.com.

Regards,

Sunil James
Technical Analyst
iDEFENSE

"iDEFENSE is a global security intelligence company that proactively
monitors sources throughout the world -- from technical vulnerabilities and
hacker profiling to the global spread of viruses and other malicious code.
The iALERT security intelligence service provides decision-makers, frontline
security professionals and network administrators with timely access to
actionable intelligence and decision support on cyber-related threats.
iDEFENSE Labs is the research wing that verifies vulnerabilities, examines
the behavior of exploits and other malicious code and discovers new
software/hardware weaknesses in a controlled lab environment."

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