/** Strip / neutralize structural markers in user-supplied text before
 *  inlining it into an agent prompt or tool result. Keeps the text
 *  human-readable; defangs the delimiters that would let an attacker
 *  impersonate a system message. */
export declare function sanitizeForInjection(text: string, maxLen?: number): string;
export interface InjectionScanResult {
    /** True iff any pattern matched. Callers use this for fast-path
     *  "log + continue" vs "log + reject" branches. */
    suspicious: boolean;
    /** Sorted+deduped list of matched pattern names. Suitable for
     *  embedding in audit-event details (audit table column has
     *  schema-bound details JSON — pattern names are safe; raw text
     *  is not, so we don't include the matched substring). */
    matched: string[];
}
export declare function scanForInjectionAttempts(text: string): InjectionScanResult;
/** Wrap user-supplied content with sentinel boundary comments. The
 *  sentinels are explicit markdown comments + a one-line preamble so
 *  models that respect such markers (per Anthropic / OpenAI guidance)
 *  treat the inner content as data. Not a hard guarantee — pair with
 *  scanForInjectionAttempts for the higher-confidence path. */
export declare function wrapAsUserContent(text: string, sourceLabel?: string): string;
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