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import type { FileEntry, Finding } from './types.js';
type FindingDraft = Omit<Finding, 'id'>;
const NESTED_QUANTIFIER_RE = /(\(.+[+*]\))[+*]|(\(.+\?\))\{/;
const toSecurityFinding = (
draft: FindingDraft,
ruleId: string,
confidence: 'high' | 'medium' | 'low',
evidence: Record<string, unknown>,
): FindingDraft => ({
...draft,
ruleId,
confidence,
evidence,
});
export function detectHardcodedSecrets(fileSummaries: FileEntry[]): FindingDraft[] {
const findings: FindingDraft[] = [];
for (const entry of fileSummaries) {
if (isTestFile(entry.file)) continue;
const secrets = (entry.suspiciousStrings || []).filter((s) =>
s.kind === 'hardcoded-secret' && s.context !== 'regex-definition' && s.context !== 'error-message',
);
if (secrets.length === 0) continue;
for (const s of secrets) {
findings.push(toSecurityFinding({
severity: 'high',
category: 'hardcoded-secret',
file: entry.file,
lineStart: s.lineStart,
lineEnd: s.lineEnd,
title: `Potential hardcoded secret${s.snippet ? `: ${s.snippet.slice(0, 20)}…` : ''}`,
reason: `String literal matches a secret pattern (password, API key, token, high-entropy string). Secrets in source code risk credential leaks. Validate: use localSearchCode to find the variable, then lspFindReferences to check if it is used in auth or network calls.`,
files: [entry.file],
suggestedFix: {
strategy: 'Move secret to environment variable or secrets manager.',
steps: [
'Replace the hardcoded value with process.env.YOUR_SECRET.',
'Add the variable to your .env file (excluded from git).',
'Verify the secret is not committed in git history.',
],
},
impact: 'Credential leak in source code exposes API access, database credentials, or authentication tokens to anyone with repo access.',
tags: ['security', 'secrets'],
lspHints: [
{
tool: 'lspFindReferences',
symbolName: s.snippet?.split(/[=:]/)[0]?.trim() || 'secret',
lineHint: s.lineStart,
file: entry.file,
expectedResult: `find all usages of this secret value — if used only in tests or as a regex pattern, it is a false positive`,
},
],
}, 'security.hardcoded-secret', 'high', {
source: s.snippet || '',
sink: 'runtime usage',
context: s.context || 'literal',
sanitizerStatus: 'missing',
propagationSteps: [`${entry.file}:${s.lineStart}`],
}));
}
}
return findings;
}
export function detectEvalUsage(fileSummaries: FileEntry[]): FindingDraft[] {
const findings: FindingDraft[] = [];
for (const entry of fileSummaries) {
if (isTestFile(entry.file)) continue;
for (const loc of entry.evalUsages || []) {
findings.push(toSecurityFinding({
severity: 'critical',
category: 'eval-usage',
file: entry.file,
lineStart: loc.lineStart,
lineEnd: loc.lineEnd,
title: 'Dynamic code execution (eval/Function)',
reason: 'eval(), new Function(), or string-based setTimeout/setInterval allows arbitrary code execution. This is a code injection vector.',
files: [entry.file],
suggestedFix: {
strategy: 'Replace dynamic code execution with safe alternatives.',
steps: [
'For JSON parsing: use JSON.parse() instead of eval().',
'For dynamic dispatch: use a lookup table or switch statement.',
'For setTimeout: pass a function reference, not a string.',
],
},
impact: 'Arbitrary code execution enables full application takeover — the most severe class of injection vulnerability.',
tags: ['security', 'injection', 'critical'],
lspHints: [
{
tool: 'lspCallHierarchy',
symbolName: 'eval',
lineHint: loc.lineStart,
file: entry.file,
expectedResult: `trace callers to find how user input reaches the eval site`,
},
],
}, 'security.eval-usage', 'high', {
sink: `eval at ${entry.file}:${loc.lineStart}-${loc.lineEnd}`,
sanitizerStatus: 'missing',
}));
}
}
return findings;
}
export function detectUnsafeHtml(fileSummaries: FileEntry[]): FindingDraft[] {
const findings: FindingDraft[] = [];
for (const entry of fileSummaries) {
if (isTestFile(entry.file)) continue;
for (const loc of entry.unsafeHtmlAssignments || []) {
findings.push(toSecurityFinding({
severity: 'high',
category: 'unsafe-html',
file: entry.file,
lineStart: loc.lineStart,
lineEnd: loc.lineEnd,
title: 'Unsafe HTML manipulation',
reason: 'innerHTML, outerHTML, dangerouslySetInnerHTML, or document.write can execute unsanitized user input as HTML/script. XSS vector.',
files: [entry.file],
suggestedFix: {
strategy: 'Use safe DOM APIs or sanitize input before insertion.',
steps: [
'Replace innerHTML with textContent for plain text.',
'Use a sanitizer library (e.g. DOMPurify) if HTML is required.',
'In React, avoid dangerouslySetInnerHTML — use JSX instead.',
],
},
impact: 'Unsanitized HTML insertion enables cross-site scripting (XSS) — attackers can steal sessions, credentials, or execute actions as the victim.',
tags: ['security', 'xss'],
}, 'security.unsafe-html', 'high', {
sink: 'DOM assignment',
sanitizerStatus: 'missing',
propagationSteps: ['html assignment'],
}));
}
}
return findings;
}
export function detectSqlInjectionRisk(fileSummaries: FileEntry[]): FindingDraft[] {
const findings: FindingDraft[] = [];
for (const entry of fileSummaries) {
if (isTestFile(entry.file)) continue;
const sqls = (entry.suspiciousStrings || []).filter((s) => s.kind === 'sql-injection');
for (const s of sqls) {
findings.push(toSecurityFinding({
severity: 'high',
category: 'sql-injection-risk',
file: entry.file,
lineStart: s.lineStart,
lineEnd: s.lineEnd,
title: 'SQL query built with template literal interpolation',
reason: 'Template literals with SQL keywords and interpolated expressions risk SQL injection if user input flows into the query.',
files: [entry.file],
suggestedFix: {
strategy: 'Use parameterized queries or a query builder.',
steps: [
'Replace template literal with parameterized query (e.g. db.query(sql, [param])).',
'Use an ORM or query builder that handles escaping.',
'If raw SQL is necessary, validate and sanitize all interpolated values.',
],
},
impact: 'SQL injection can expose, modify, or destroy database contents and potentially escalate to full server compromise.',
tags: ['security', 'injection', 'sql'],
}, 'security.sql-injection-risk', 'high', {
sink: `sql template literal`,
sanitizerStatus: 'missing',
propagationSteps: [`${entry.file}:${s.lineStart}-${s.lineEnd}`],
}));
}
}
return findings;
}
export function detectUnsafeRegex(fileSummaries: FileEntry[]): FindingDraft[] {
const findings: FindingDraft[] = [];
for (const entry of fileSummaries) {
if (isTestFile(entry.file)) continue;
for (const re of entry.regexLiterals || []) {
if (NESTED_QUANTIFIER_RE.test(re.pattern)) {
findings.push(toSecurityFinding({
severity: 'medium',
category: 'unsafe-regex',
file: entry.file,
lineStart: re.lineStart,
lineEnd: re.lineEnd,
title: 'Regex with catastrophic backtracking risk',
reason: `Pattern "${re.pattern.slice(0, 40)}" has nested quantifiers that can cause exponential backtracking (ReDoS).`,
files: [entry.file],
suggestedFix: {
strategy: 'Simplify the regex or use atomic groups / possessive quantifiers.',
steps: [
'Remove nested quantifiers — e.g. change (a+)+ to a+.',
'Use a regex linter (e.g. safe-regex) to validate patterns.',
'Consider using string methods instead of complex regexes.',
],
},
impact: 'Catastrophic backtracking causes CPU exhaustion — a single crafted input string can hang the event loop (ReDoS).',
tags: ['security', 'regex', 'performance'],
lspHints: [
{
tool: 'lspFindReferences',
symbolName: re.pattern.slice(0, 20),
lineHint: re.lineStart,
file: entry.file,
expectedResult: `find where this regex is used to assess if user input reaches it`,
},
],
}, 'security.unsafe-regex', 'medium', {
source: re.pattern,
sink: `Regex execution`,
sanitizerStatus: 'not-applicable',
propagationSteps: [`${entry.file}:${re.lineStart}-${re.lineEnd}`],
}));
}
}
}
return findings;
}
export function detectPrototypePollutionRisk(fileSummaries: FileEntry[]): FindingDraft[] {
const findings: FindingDraft[] = [];
for (const entry of fileSummaries) {
if (isTestFile(entry.file)) continue;
if (!entry.prototypePollutionSites || entry.prototypePollutionSites.length === 0) continue;
for (const site of entry.prototypePollutionSites) {
// Use guarded field to downgrade severity: guarded computed-property-writes are low risk
let severity: Finding['severity'];
let confidence: 'high' | 'medium' | 'low';
if (site.kind === 'computed-property-write') {
if (site.guarded) {
severity = 'low';
confidence = 'low';
} else {
severity = 'high';
confidence = 'medium';
}
} else {
severity = 'medium';
confidence = 'medium';
}
findings.push(toSecurityFinding({
severity,
category: 'prototype-pollution-risk',
file: entry.file,
lineStart: site.lineStart,
lineEnd: site.lineEnd,
title: `Prototype pollution risk: ${site.kind}${site.guarded ? ' (guarded)' : ''}`,
reason: `${site.detail}${site.guarded ? ' — guards detected (internal iteration or key check), likely false positive. Verify the key variable does not trace to external input.' : ''}`,
files: [entry.file],
suggestedFix: {
strategy: 'Guard against __proto__, constructor, and prototype keys before merging.',
steps: [
'Validate keys: reject "__proto__", "constructor", "prototype" before assignment.',
'Use Object.create(null) as the target for merges when possible.',
'Replace custom deep-merge with a hardened library (e.g. lodash.merge with prototype guard).',
'For Object.assign, ensure the source is sanitized or use structuredClone().',
],
},
impact: 'Prototype pollution can override built-in methods, bypass security checks, or achieve remote code execution.',
tags: ['security', 'prototype-pollution', 'injection'],
lspHints: [
{
tool: 'lspCallHierarchy',
symbolName: site.kind === 'computed-property-write' ? 'bracket-assignment' : site.detail.split('(')[0],
lineHint: site.lineStart,
file: entry.file,
expectedResult: `trace callers to determine if user-controlled data reaches this site — if key comes from Object.keys() on internal object, dismiss as false positive`,
},
],
}, 'security.prototype-pollution-risk', confidence, {
source: site.kind,
sink: site.detail,
guarded: site.guarded,
sanitizerStatus: site.guarded ? 'present' : 'missing',
propagationSteps: [`${entry.file}:${site.lineStart}`],
}));
}
}
return findings;
}
export function detectUnvalidatedInputSink(fileSummaries: FileEntry[]): FindingDraft[] {
const findings: FindingDraft[] = [];
for (const entry of fileSummaries) {
if (isTestFile(entry.file)) continue;
for (const src of entry.inputSources || []) {
if (!src.hasSinkInBody || src.hasValidation) continue;
const sinkLabel = src.sinkKinds.join(', ');
const severity = src.paramConfidence === 'low' ? 'medium' : 'high';
findings.push(toSecurityFinding({
severity,
category: 'unvalidated-input-sink',
file: entry.file,
lineStart: src.lineStart,
lineEnd: src.lineEnd,
title: `Unvalidated input reaches ${sinkLabel} sink in ${src.functionName}(${src.sourceParams.join(', ')})`,
reason: `Parameter${src.sourceParams.length > 1 ? 's' : ''} '${src.sourceParams.join("', '")}' (external input) flow${src.sourceParams.length === 1 ? 's' : ''} into ${sinkLabel} without validation (no type guard, schema call, or conditional check).`,
files: [entry.file],
suggestedFix: {
strategy: 'Add input validation before the sink operation.',
steps: [
'Add schema validation (e.g. zod, joi) for input parameters.',
'Use parameterized APIs instead of template interpolation for SQL/exec.',
`Trace data flow: lspCallHierarchy(outgoing) on ${src.functionName}.`,
],
},
impact: 'Unvalidated external input reaching a dangerous sink (eval, SQL, exec, innerHTML, file write) enables injection attacks.',
tags: ['security', 'input-validation', 'injection'],
lspHints: [
{
tool: 'lspCallHierarchy',
symbolName: src.functionName,
lineHint: src.lineStart,
file: entry.file,
expectedResult: `trace outgoing calls to see where ${src.sourceParams.join(', ')} data flows`,
},
{
tool: 'lspFindReferences',
symbolName: src.sourceParams[0],
lineHint: src.lineStart,
file: entry.file,
expectedResult: `check all usages of ${src.sourceParams[0]} parameter within function`,
},
],
}, 'security.unvalidated-input-sink', severity === 'high' ? 'high' : 'medium', {
sourceParameters: src.sourceParams,
sink: sinkLabel,
sanitizerStatus: src.hasValidation ? 'present' : 'missing',
propagationSteps: src.callsWithInputArgs.map((call) => `${call.callee}:${call.lineStart}`),
}));
}
}
return findings;
}
export function detectInputPassthroughRisk(fileSummaries: FileEntry[]): FindingDraft[] {
const findings: FindingDraft[] = [];
for (const entry of fileSummaries) {
if (isTestFile(entry.file)) continue;
for (const src of entry.inputSources || []) {
if (src.callsWithInputArgs.length === 0 || src.hasValidation) continue;
if (src.hasSinkInBody) continue;
if (src.paramConfidence === 'low') continue;
const callees = src.callsWithInputArgs.map(c => c.callee);
const uniqueCallees = [...new Set(callees)];
const severity = src.paramConfidence === 'high' ? 'medium' : 'low';
findings.push(toSecurityFinding({
severity,
category: 'input-passthrough-risk',
file: entry.file,
lineStart: src.lineStart,
lineEnd: src.lineEnd,
title: `Input passthrough without validation in ${src.functionName}(${src.sourceParams.join(', ')})`,
reason: `Parameter${src.sourceParams.length > 1 ? 's' : ''} '${src.sourceParams.join("', '")}' (external input) ${src.sourceParams.length === 1 ? 'is' : 'are'} passed to ${uniqueCallees.join(', ')} without validation. Downstream callees may not validate either.`,
files: [entry.file],
suggestedFix: {
strategy: 'Validate input before passing to downstream functions.',
steps: [
'Add schema validation (e.g. zod, joi) at the entry point.',
`Trace downstream: lspCallHierarchy(outgoing) on ${src.functionName} to verify callees validate.`,
'Search for validation middleware: localSearchCode for guard/validate/sanitize patterns.',
],
},
impact: 'Unchecked input passed downstream can reach sinks in callees — validation gaps compound across the call chain.',
tags: ['security', 'input-validation', 'passthrough'],
lspHints: [
{
tool: 'lspCallHierarchy',
symbolName: src.functionName,
lineHint: src.lineStart,
file: entry.file,
expectedResult: `trace outgoing calls to verify downstream validation of ${src.sourceParams.join(', ')}`,
},
{
tool: 'lspFindReferences',
symbolName: src.sourceParams[0],
lineHint: src.lineStart,
file: entry.file,
expectedResult: `find all usages of ${src.sourceParams[0]} to check if validation occurs upstream`,
},
],
}, 'security.input-passthrough-risk', severity, {
sourceParameters: src.sourceParams,
sink: uniqueCallees.join(', '),
sanitizerStatus: src.hasValidation ? 'present' : 'missing',
propagationSteps: src.callsWithInputArgs.map((call) => `${call.callee}:${call.lineStart}`),
}));
}
}
return findings;
}
// ─── Path Traversal Risk ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
export function detectPathTraversalRisk(fileSummaries: FileEntry[]): FindingDraft[] {
const findings: FindingDraft[] = [];
for (const entry of fileSummaries) {
if (isTestFile(entry.file)) continue;
for (const src of entry.inputSources || []) {
const fsReadSinks = src.sinkKinds.filter(k => k === 'fs-read' || k === 'path-resolve');
if (fsReadSinks.length === 0) continue;
if (src.paramConfidence === 'low') continue;
const hasValidation = src.hasValidation;
const severity: Finding['severity'] = hasValidation ? 'medium' : 'high';
const sinkLabel = fsReadSinks.join(', ');
findings.push(toSecurityFinding({
severity,
category: 'path-traversal-risk',
file: entry.file,
lineStart: src.lineStart,
lineEnd: src.lineEnd,
title: `Path traversal risk: ${src.functionName}(${src.sourceParams.join(', ')}) → ${sinkLabel}`,
reason: `Parameter${src.sourceParams.length > 1 ? 's' : ''} '${src.sourceParams.join("', '")}' (external input) flow${src.sourceParams.length === 1 ? 's' : ''} into ${sinkLabel} ${hasValidation ? 'with partial validation — verify path normalization + prefix check + realpath resolution' : 'without validation. Path traversal (e.g. ../../etc/passwd) can read or write arbitrary files'}.`,
files: [entry.file],
suggestedFix: {
strategy: 'Add multi-layer path validation before file system operations.',
steps: [
'Normalize the path: path.resolve(basePath, userInput).',
'Prefix check: resolvedPath.startsWith(basePath + path.sep).',
'Resolve symlinks: fs.realpathSync() to prevent symlink escape.',
'Re-validate after symlink resolution.',
],
},
impact: 'Path traversal enables reading sensitive files (credentials, configs, source code) or writing to arbitrary locations (code injection via file overwrite).',
tags: ['security', 'path-traversal', 'agentic'],
lspHints: [
{
tool: 'lspCallHierarchy',
symbolName: src.functionName,
lineHint: src.lineStart,
file: entry.file,
expectedResult: `trace incoming callers to determine if path parameter comes from user input — then trace outgoing to the fs/path call`,
},
],
}, 'security.path-traversal-risk', src.paramConfidence === 'high' ? 'high' : 'medium', {
sourceParameters: src.sourceParams,
sink: sinkLabel,
sanitizerStatus: hasValidation ? 'partial' : 'missing',
propagationSteps: src.callsWithInputArgs.map((call) => `${call.callee}:${call.lineStart}`),
}));
}
}
return findings;
}
// ─── Command Injection Risk ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
export function detectCommandInjectionRisk(fileSummaries: FileEntry[]): FindingDraft[] {
const findings: FindingDraft[] = [];
for (const entry of fileSummaries) {
if (isTestFile(entry.file)) continue;
for (const src of entry.inputSources || []) {
const execSinks = src.sinkKinds.filter(k => k === 'exec');
if (execSinks.length === 0) continue;
if (src.paramConfidence === 'low') continue;
// Check callee names to distinguish exec (dangerous) from spawn with array args (safer)
const execCallees = src.callsWithInputArgs.filter(c =>
/\.exec\b|^exec$|^execSync$|child_process\.exec/.test(c.callee),
);
const spawnCallees = src.callsWithInputArgs.filter(c =>
/\.spawn\b|^spawn$|^spawnSync$|child_process\.spawn/.test(c.callee),
);
// exec with string interpolation is critical, spawn with shell:true is high
if (execCallees.length > 0) {
const severity: Finding['severity'] = src.paramConfidence === 'high' ? 'critical' : 'high';
findings.push(toSecurityFinding({
severity,
category: 'command-injection-risk',
file: entry.file,
lineStart: src.lineStart,
lineEnd: src.lineEnd,
title: `Command injection risk: ${src.functionName}(${src.sourceParams.join(', ')}) → exec`,
reason: `Parameter${src.sourceParams.length > 1 ? 's' : ''} '${src.sourceParams.join("', '")}' (external input) flow${src.sourceParams.length === 1 ? 's' : ''} into exec/execSync. exec() runs commands through a shell — string interpolation enables command injection.`,
files: [entry.file],
suggestedFix: {
strategy: 'Replace exec with spawn using array arguments (no shell interpretation).',
steps: [
'Replace child_process.exec(cmd) with child_process.spawn(binary, [args]).',
'Never interpolate user input into command strings.',
'Use an allowlist for permitted commands if dynamic dispatch is needed.',
'If shell features are required, validate input against a strict allowlist.',
],
},
impact: 'Command injection enables arbitrary OS command execution — full server compromise, data exfiltration, or lateral movement.',
tags: ['security', 'command-injection', 'critical', 'agentic'],
lspHints: [
{
tool: 'lspCallHierarchy',
symbolName: src.functionName,
lineHint: src.lineStart,
file: entry.file,
expectedResult: `trace incoming callers to verify if user input reaches the exec call — check for allowlist or sanitization`,
},
],
}, 'security.command-injection-risk', src.paramConfidence === 'high' ? 'high' : 'medium', {
sourceParameters: src.sourceParams,
sink: 'exec',
sanitizerStatus: src.hasValidation ? 'partial' : 'missing',
propagationSteps: execCallees.map((call) => `${call.callee}:${call.lineStart}`),
}));
}
if (spawnCallees.length > 0 && execCallees.length === 0) {
// spawn is safer but shell:true makes it equivalent to exec
findings.push(toSecurityFinding({
severity: 'high',
category: 'command-injection-risk',
file: entry.file,
lineStart: src.lineStart,
lineEnd: src.lineEnd,
title: `Potential command injection: ${src.functionName}(${src.sourceParams.join(', ')}) → spawn`,
reason: `Parameter${src.sourceParams.length > 1 ? 's' : ''} '${src.sourceParams.join("', '")}' (external input) flow${src.sourceParams.length === 1 ? 's' : ''} into spawn. If shell:true is set, this is equivalent to exec. Verify spawn uses array args without shell option.`,
files: [entry.file],
suggestedFix: {
strategy: 'Ensure spawn uses array arguments without shell: true.',
steps: [
'Verify spawn is called as spawn(binary, [arg1, arg2]) — NOT spawn(cmd, { shell: true }).',
'Remove shell: true if present.',
'Validate command arguments against an allowlist.',
],
},
impact: 'spawn with shell:true enables the same command injection as exec. Without shell:true, spawn with array args is safe from injection.',
tags: ['security', 'command-injection', 'agentic'],
lspHints: [
{
tool: 'lspCallHierarchy',
symbolName: src.functionName,
lineHint: src.lineStart,
file: entry.file,
expectedResult: `trace incoming callers — check if spawn uses shell:true option`,
},
],
}, 'security.command-injection-risk', 'medium', {
sourceParameters: src.sourceParams,
sink: 'spawn',
sanitizerStatus: src.hasValidation ? 'partial' : 'missing',
propagationSteps: spawnCallees.map((call) => `${call.callee}:${call.lineStart}`),
}));
}
}
}
return findings;
}
|