---
name: django-access-review
description: django-access-review
risk: unknown
source: community
---

---
name: django-access-review
description: Django access control and IDOR security review. Use when reviewing Django views, DRF viewsets, ORM queries, or any Python/Django code handling user authorization. Trigger keywords: "IDOR", "access control", "authorization", "Django permissions", "object permissions", "tenant...
--- LICENSE
---

<!--
Reference material based on OWASP Cheat Sheet Series (CC BY-SA 4.0)
https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/
-->

# Django Access Control & IDOR Review

Find access control vulnerabilities by investigating how the codebase answers one question:

**Can User A access, modify, or delete User B's data?**

## Philosophy: Investigation Over Pattern Matching

Do NOT scan for predefined vulnerable patterns. Instead:

1. **Understand** how authorization works in THIS codebase
2. **Ask questions** about specific data flows
3. **Trace code** to find where (or if) access checks happen
4. **Report** only what you've confirmed through investigation

Every codebase implements authorization differently. Your job is to understand this specific implementation, then find gaps.

---

## Phase 1: Understand the Authorization Model

Before looking for bugs, answer these questions about the codebase:

### How is authorization enforced?

Research the codebase to find:

```
□ Where are permission checks implemented?
  - Decorators? (@login_required, @permission_required, custom?)
  - Middleware? (TenantMiddleware, AuthorizationMiddleware?)
  - Base classes? (BaseAPIView, TenantScopedViewSet?)
  - Permission classes? (DRF permission_classes?)
  - Custom mixins? (OwnershipMixin, TenantMixin?)

□ How are queries scoped?
  - Custom managers? (TenantManager, UserScopedManager?)
  - get_queryset() overrides?
  - Middleware that sets query context?

□ What's the ownership model?
  - Single user ownership? (document.owner_id)
  - Organization/tenant ownership? (document.organization_id)
  - Hierarchical? (org -> team -> user -> resource)
  - Role-based within context? (org admin vs member)
```

### Investigation commands

```bash
# Find how auth is typically done
grep -rn "permission_classes\|@login_required\|@permission_required" --include="*.py" | head -20

# Find base classes that views inherit from
grep -rn "class Base.*View\|class.*Mixin.*:" --include="*.py" | head -20

# Find custom managers
grep -rn "class.*Manager\|def get_queryset" --include="*.py" | head -20

# Find ownership fields on models
grep -rn "owner\|user_id\|organization\|tenant" --include="models.py" | head -30
```

**Do not proceed until you understand the authorization model.**

---

## Phase 2: Map the Attack Surface

Identify endpoints that handle user-specific data:

### What resources exist?

```
□ What models contain user data?
□ Which have ownership fields (owner_id, user_id, organization_id)?
□ Which are accessed via ID in URLs or request bodies?
```

### What operations are exposed?

For each resource, map:
- List endpoints - what data is returned?
- Detail/retrieve endpoints - how is the object fetched?
- Create endpoints - who sets the owner?
- Update endpoints - can users modify others' data?
- Delete endpoints - can users delete others' data?
- Custom actions - what do they access?

---

## Phase 3: Ask Questions and Investigate

For each endpoint that handles user data, ask:

### The Core Question

**"If I'm User A and I know the ID of User B's resource, can I access it?"**

Trace the code to answer this:

```
1. Where does the resource ID enter the system?
   - URL path: /api/documents/{id}/
   - Query param: ?document_id=123
   - Request body: {"document_id": 123}

2. Where is that ID used to fetch data?
   - Find the ORM query or database call

3. Between (1) and (2), what checks exist?
   - Is the query scoped to current user?
   - Is there an explicit ownership check?
   - Is there a permission check on the object?
   - Does a base class or mixin enforce access?

4. If you can't find a check, is there one you missed?
   - Check parent classes
   - Check middleware
   - Check managers
   - Check decorators at URL level
```

### Follow-Up Questions

```
□ For list endpoints: Does the query filter to user's data, or return everything?

□ For create endpoints: Who sets the owner - the server or the request?

□ For bulk operations: Are they scoped to user's data?

□ For related resources: If I can access a document, can I access its comments?
  What if the document belongs to someone else?

□ For tenant/org resources: Can User in Org A access Org B's data by changing
  the org_id in the URL?
```

---

## Phase 4: Trace Specific Flows

Pick a concrete endpoint and trace it completely.

### Example Investigation

```
Endpoint: GET /api/documents/{pk}/

1. Find the view handling this URL
   → DocumentViewSet.retrieve() in api/views.py

2. Check what DocumentViewSet inherits from
   → class DocumentViewSet(viewsets.ModelViewSet)
   → No custom base class with authorization

3. Check permission_classes
   → permission_classes = [IsAuthenticated]
   → Only checks login, not ownership

4. Check get_queryset()
   → def get_queryset(self):
   →     return Document.objects.all()
   → Returns ALL documents!

5. Check for has_object_permission()
   → Not implemented

6. Check retrieve() method
   → Uses default, which calls get_object()
   → get_object() uses get_queryset(), which returns all

7. Conclusion: IDOR - Any authenticated user can access any document
```

### What to look for when tracing

```
Potential gap indicators (investigate further, don't auto-flag):
- get_queryset() returns .all() or filters without user
- Direct Model.objects.get(pk=pk) without ownership in query
- ID comes from request body for sensitive operations
- Permission class checks auth but not ownership
- No has_object_permission() and queryset isn't scoped

Likely safe patterns (but verify the implementation):
- get_queryset() filters by request.user or user's org
- Custom permission class with has_object_permission()
- Base class that enforces scoping
- Manager that auto-filters
```

---

## Phase 5: Report Findings

Only report issues you've confirmed through investigation.

### Confidence Levels

| Level | Meaning | Action |
|-------|---------|--------|
| **HIGH** | Traced the flow, confirmed no check exists | Report with evidence |
| **MEDIUM** | Check may exist but couldn't confirm | Note for manual verification |
| **LOW** | Theoretical, likely mitigated | Do not report |

### Suggested Fixes Must Enforce, Not Document

**Bad fix**: Adding a comment saying "caller must validate permissions"
**Good fix**: Adding code that actually validates permissions

A comment or docstring does not enforce authorization. Your suggested fix must include actual code that:
- Validates the user has permission before proceeding
- Raises an exception or returns an error if unauthorized
- Makes unauthorized access impossible, not just discouraged

Example of a BAD fix suggestion:
```python
def get_resource(resource_id):
    # IMPORTANT: Caller must ensure user has access to this resource
    return Resource.objects.get(pk=resource_id)
```

Example of a GOOD fix suggestion:
```python
def get_resource(resource_id, user):
    resource = Resource.objects.get(pk=resource_id)
    if resource.owner_id != user.id:
        raise PermissionDenied("Access denied")
    return resource
```

If you can't determine the right enforcement mechanism, say so - but never suggest documentation as the fix.

### Report Format

```markdown
## Access Control Review: [Component]

### Authorization Model
[Brief description of how this codebase handles authorization]

### Findings

#### [IDOR-001] [Title] (Severity: High/Medium)
- **Location**: `path/to/file.py:123`
- **Confidence**: High - confirmed through code tracing
- **The Question**: Can User A access User B's documents?
- **Investigation**:
  1. Traced GET /api/documents/{pk}/ to DocumentViewSet
  2. Checked get_queryset() - returns Document.objects.all()
  3. Checked permission_classes - only IsAuthenticated
  4. Checked for has_object_permission() - not implemented
  5. Verified no relevant middleware or base class checks
- **Evidence**: [Code snippet showing the gap]
- **Impact**: Any authenticated user can read any document by ID
- **Suggested Fix**: [Code that enforces authorization - NOT a comment]

### Needs Manual Verification
[Issues where authorization exists but couldn't confirm effectiveness]

### Areas Not Reviewed
[Endpoints or flows not covered in this review]
```

---

## Common Django Authorization Patterns

These are patterns you might find - not a checklist to match against.

### Query Scoping
```python
# Scoped to user
Document.objects.filter(owner=request.user)

# Scoped to organization
Document.objects.filter(organization=request.user.organization)

# Using a custom manager
Document.objects.for_user(request.user)  # Investigate what this does
```

### Permission Enforcement
```python
# DRF permission classes
permission_classes = [IsAuthenticated, IsOwner]

# Custom has_object_permission
def has_object_permission(self, request, view, obj):
    return obj.owner == request.user

# Django decorators
@permission_required('app.view_document')

# Manual checks
if document.owner != request.user:
    raise PermissionDenied()
```

### Ownership Assignment
```python
# Server-side (safe)
def perform_create(self, serializer):
    serializer.save(owner=self.request.user)

# From request (investigate)
serializer.save(**request.data)  # Does request.data include owner?
```

---

## Investigation Checklist

Use this to guide your review, not as a pass/fail checklist:

```
□ I understand how authorization is typically implemented in this codebase
□ I've identified the ownership model (user, org, tenant, etc.)
□ I've mapped the key endpoints that handle user data
□ For each sensitive endpoint, I've traced the flow and asked:
  - Where does the ID come from?
  - Where is data fetched?
  - What checks exist between input and data access?
□ I've verified my findings by checking parent classes and middleware
□ I've only reported issues I've confirmed through investigation
```
