/**
 * Sealed built-in denylist for the capability gate (AUTO.3).
 * Spec: `docs/tasks/automation.md` AUTO.3 risk callouts.
 *
 * Value-only constants file. Exports are `Object.freeze`d so a misbehaving
 * consumer can't monkey-patch at runtime (the audit constraint demands the
 * built-in denylist be sealed; no `BUILTIN_SHELL_DENY.push(...)` escape).
 *
 * Escape hatch: env var `OPENSQUID_TRUST_BUILTIN_DENY=0` disables the
 * entire built-in denylist at gate construction time. The gate snapshots
 * the env once in its constructor; it can't be flipped mid-session.
 *
 * Channel + binary built-in denies are empty by design — shell + path
 * cover the high-risk surface; channels/binaries are user-defined.
 *
 * Imported by: src/runtime/capability_gate.ts.
 */
export declare const BUILTIN_SHELL_DENY: readonly RegExp[];
export declare const SHELL_METACHARACTERS: readonly string[];
export declare const BUILTIN_PATH_DENY: readonly string[];
export declare const BUILTIN_CHANNEL_DENY: readonly string[];
export declare const BUILTIN_BINARY_DENY: readonly string[];
export declare const BUILTIN_SUBAGENT_DENY: readonly string[];
export declare function trustBuiltinDeny(env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv): boolean;
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