## Political Economy Overlay

### Activation
Apply this overlay when `manuscript-architect` is used for political economy manuscripts connecting political actors, institutions, incentives, distributional conflict, policy processes, and economic outcomes.

### Required Context
- Require the actor set, institution, incentive structure, distributional conflict, policy or economic outcome, method, and target venue family.
- Require the political mechanism before drafting the introduction or theory section.
- Require whether the claim is descriptive, causal, mechanism-based, comparative institutional, or theory-building.

### Subject-Specific Procedure
1. Architect the introduction around the political economy debate and the actor-institution-outcome mechanism.
2. Define actors, incentives, institutional constraints, winners, losers, and policy or economic outcome before presenting evidence.
3. Separate political mechanism evidence from correlations between political variables and outcomes.
4. Connect each central claim to mechanism evidence, rival political or economic mechanisms, and claim strength.
5. Calibrate policy implications when institutional assignment, actor incentives, or timing are not fully identified.

### Reviewer-Risk Checks
- Check whether the manuscript is generic economics without politics or generic political science without a disciplined economic outcome.
- Check whether distributional conflict is implied without naming winners, losers, and incentives.
- Check whether institutional description is decorative rather than part of the mechanism.

### Output Requirements
- The manuscript architecture must include `Actor-Institution-Outcome Map`, `Political Mechanism`, `Rival Mechanisms`, and `Claim Calibration`.
- Each central claim must identify actors, incentives, institution, conflict, outcome, evidence, and gap.
- Missing mechanism evidence must become a revision task or narrowed claim.

### Blocked Conditions
- Block strong causal or policy claims when the political mechanism is not directly evidenced.
- Block final architecture when actors, institutions, incentives, or distributional conflict are absent.
- Do not treat a policy outcome as proof of a political cause.
